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TEACHING AN OLD POLICY NEW TRICKS: 
THE 421-A TAX PROGRAM AND THE FLAWS 
OF TRICKLE-DOWN HOUSING 
Seth B. Cohen* 
INTRODUCTION 
In his 1890 tenement housing exposé How The Other Half 
Lives, journalist and photographer Jacob Riis remarked: 
There are three effective ways of dealing with the 
tenements: By law. By remodeling and making the most out 
of the old houses. By building new, model tenements. 
Private enterprise . . . [m]ust do the lion’s share under these 
last two heads . . . [but t]he State may have to bring down 
the rents . . . [b]y assuming the right to regulate them . . . .1 
Despite decades of legislation, the challenge of affordable 
housing remains a hallmark of living for New York City (“City”) 
residents who earn low-income wages.2 Riis’ concerns over housing 
                                                           
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2009; B.A., Tufts University, 2000. 
Thanks to: the members of the Journal of Law and Policy for their help; 
Brooklyn Legal Services Corporation A for the inspiration behind this Note; 
Professor David Reiss for his guidance; and Assemblyman Vito Lopez and 
Council Member David Yassky for taking time out of their busy schedule to 
speak with me. Special thanks to Rebecca Cohen, as well as the Cohen and 
Webb families, for their support. 
1 JACOB RIIS, HOW THE OTHER HALF LIVES 223–24 (Courier Dover 
Publications 1971) (1890), available at http://www.yale.edu/amstud/inforev/ 
riis/chap25.html. 
2 Various state and federal programs have different definitions of “low-
income.” The federal government generally defines “low-income” as 80% or less 
of the Area Median Income (“AMI”). Public Health and Welfare Act § 10, 42 
U.S.C. § 12704 (1994). The AMI for the New York City area is currently 
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were mainly those of overcrowding and substandard conditions.3 
Today, though, unaffordability is the chief concern for housing 
advocates.4 Statistics demonstrate the sobering fact of the City’s 
high cost of living: At the most general level, New York City 
(“City”) is ranked 9th highest in a nationwide survey of monthly 
rental costs ($909 per month), but a substantial portion of the 
population has difficulty paying their rental bill because the City’s 
median household income is only $43,434.5 Additionally, more 
than half of City households spend over 30% of their income on 
housing,6 but for renters, the situation is even more serious; almost 
one-third of all City families that rent their homes spend over 50% 
of their income solely on housing.7 For those earning low-income 
wages, the problem is only intensified: among this group of renters, 
                                                           
$70,900 for a four-person family; low-income for a four-person family is 
approximately $56,700. See DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FY2006 NEW 
YORK INCOME LIMITS 1, http://www.huduser.org/Datasets/IL/IL06/ny_fy2006 
.pdf [hereinafter HUD, NEW YORK]. 
3 See RIIS, supra note 1, at 1. 
4 See, e.g., HOUSING HERE AND NOW, LOSING GROUND: HOW MIDDLE 
CLASS, WORKING AND POOR NEW YORKERS ARE BEING PRICED OUT 5 (2007), 
available at http://www.newyorkisourhome.org/LosingGroundReport.pdf. 
(“There is no doubt that New York City is in the midst of a housing 
affordability crisis.”); OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK CITY COMPTROLLER, POLICY 
BRIEF: OVERVIEW OF SECTION 421-A HOUSING SUBSIDY DISTRIBUTION 2 
(2006), available at http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/press/pdfs/05-23-06_ 
policy_brief_421a.pdf. [hereinafter COMPTROLLER, OVERVIEW] (“New York 
faces a very serious housing affordability crisis.”). 
5 NEW YORK CITY RENT GUIDELINES BD., 2007 INCOME AND 
AFFORDABILITY STUDY 6 (2007), available at http://www.housingnyc.com/ 
downloads/research/pdf_reports/ia07.pdf. 
6 THE CITY OF NEW YORK, PLANYC REPORT 18, available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/downloads/pdf/report_housing.pdf 
[hereinafter PLANYC]. “The generally accepted definition of affordability is for a 
household to pay no more than 30 percent of its annual income on housing.” See 
Housing and Urban Development, Community Planning & Development, 
Affordable Housing, http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing (last 
visted Apr. 14, 2008). 
7 DR. MOON WHA LEE, NEW YORK CITY DEP’T OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV., 
SELECTED FINDINGS OF THE 2005 NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AND VACANCY 
SURVEY 7 (2005), available at http://www.housingnyc.com/downloads/ 
research/hvs05/05summary.pdf. 
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the majority of their income is devoted to paying rent.8 
Population projections predict an additional 1.2 million New 
Yorkers by 2025.9 The City has estimated that an additional 
172,000 units of housing, “above the 210,000 already in 
development, planned, or being preserved[,]” will be needed just to 
meet the demand.10 However, given the current robust housing 
market in the City11 and a rapidly shrinking number of available 
affordable apartments,12 the affordable housing crisis will only 
continue to get worse without government intervention. 
Scholars have identified four basic reasons for national or local 
governments to support subsidization of housing rather than 
relying on a deregulated housing market:13 First, housing is a “basic 
                                                           
8 AMY ARMSTRONG ET AL., FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN 
POL’Y, STATE OF NEW YORK CITY’S HOUSING AND NEIGHBORHOODS 2006, at 
36 (2006), available at http://furmancenter.nyu.edu/SOC2006.htm [hereinafter 
FURMAN, HOUSING] (noting that the median rent burden for unsubsidized low-
income renters was 50.4% in 2005). 
9 COMPTROLLER, OVERVIEW, supra note 4, at 1. The predicted growth is 
largely attributable to continued immigration to the City as well as increased 
rates of reproduction. Sam Roberts, Coming Soon, 9 Million Stories in the 
Crowded City, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006, § 1, at 33. 
10 Ken Fisher, Complex Policy Choices In Managing Growth, N.Y. L.J., 
Jan. 16, 2007, § 8, col. 1. 
11 COMPTROLLER, OVERVIEW, supra note 4, at 1 (“The number of new 
housing permits . . . has grown steadily and dramatically [and a] Citywide surge 
in market rate housing construction has been accompanied by large increases in 
residential . . . property values.”). No doubt, the City is unique in this regard, 
as much of the rest of the country is experiencing a housing market slump and 
the market in the City has reached a plateau as of late. Diana Cardwell & Ray 
Rivera, Long Robust, Gains in New York City Property Values Start to Flatten 
Out, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2008, at B1. These predictions are based on an 
assumption that the demand for housing in the City will continue to rise. 
12 PLANYC, supra note 6 (“According to the Furman Center, the number 
of apartments affordable to low- and moderate-income New Yorkers shrank by 
205,000 units between 2002 and 2005.”). This decline in affordable rentals was 
attributed to several factors, including a construction industry lagging behind a 
growing population, immigration, and the fact that “much of the new housing 
has been for people with higher incomes, and most of it has been for sale, not for 
rent.” Janny Scott, Housing Tighter for New Yorkers of Moderate Pay, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 16, 2006, at A1. 
13 J. Peter Byrne & Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure 
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human need” that society is morally obliged to help provide;14 
second, subsidizing decent affordable housing is a better option 
than simply providing public money to eligible recipients;15 third, 
the negative externalities on society that come with inadequate 
housing are mitigated by subsidization; and fourth, the market 
alone will not provide adequate affordable housing.16 
The City is no stranger to these rationales for providing public 
housing, having long leveraged the law to provide better housing 
opportunities for the poor.17 In fact, the City championed the 
“nation’s first tenement laws, [its] first comprehensive zoning 
ordinance, and [created] its first public housing project.”18 
Congress eventually followed the City’s initiative when it enacted 
the Public Housing Act of 193719 and the Housing Act of 1949, 
which declared “a national policy of ‘a decent home and a suitable 
living environment for every American family.’”20 In the face of 
federal budget reductions for housing programs,21 however, the 
heavy lifting of “housing assistance now is accomplished primarily 
through a variety of indirect subsidies moving through state and 
                                                           
and Urban Policy: The Matrix Revealed, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 529–30 
(2007). 
14 Id. at 530. The authors note the essential nature of housing as a shelter 
against the elements and as a social “center of . . . family life.” Id. 
15 Id. Byrne and Diamond note a variety of paternalistic reasons for their 
claim, including: mistrust in simply giving recipients public money to use; 
creation of a durable community asset; benefits to the dependents of the 
recipients; indirect positive affects to the recipient, and the ability for 
beneficiaries to put money toward other needs such as education and health. Id. 
16 Id. at 530–31. Echoing Jacob Riis, the authors point to such negative 
externalities as crime and disease. Id. at 530. Given ever-rising costs in 
producing and preserving housing, the market will naturally tend to favor 
wealthier individuals in order to offset the production cost and profit from 
housing development. Id. at 531. 
17 FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN POL’Y, HOUSING POLICY IN 
NEW YORK CITY: A BRIEF HISTORY 1 (2006), available at http://www. 
furmancenter.nyu.edu/publications/documents/NYChousingpolicybrief1.pdf. 
18 Id. 
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local governments and private developers.”22 
By harnessing federal, state, and local resources, the City has 
demonstrated its commitment to ensure affordable housing 
development and preservation.23 As part of an ambitious 10-year 
plan, the City aims to “[p]reserve 73,000 units of affordable 
housing for 220,000 New Yorkers, [including those] where 
subsidies are set to expire in the near future[,] and [c]reate 92,000 
units of affordable housing for 280,000 New Yorkers.”24 Over the 
next ten years, it has been estimated that the City will use $3.2 
billion of its own funds to renovate distressed buildings, provide 
$500 million in tax-exempt bonds to create and maintain low- and 
moderate-income housing, and administer over $1 billion in federal 
funds to provide funds for housing cost vouchers, low-income 
housing tax credits, and other programs.25 The high levels of 
affordable housing the City is pledging to create or preserve, 
coupled with significant amounts of money being directed toward 
the problem, demonstrate that the City is serious about affordable 
housing. 
Another non-traditional (and little-analyzed) method that New 
York State has used to try to foster affordable housing production 
in the City is to entice private developers with tax incentives for 
building such units, thus integrating Riis’ propositions.26 These tax 
incentives, named for the Section 421-a of the New York Real 
Property Tax Law provision that establishes them, have come to 
be known as the 421-a program.27 
                                                           
22 Id. 
23 NEW YORK CITY DEP’T OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV., THE NEW HOUSING 
MARKETPLACE: CREATING HOUSING FOR THE NEXT GENERATION 17 (2004), 
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/downloads/pdf/10yearHMplan.pdf. 
24 Id. at 3. 
25 PRATT CTR. FOR COMMUNITY DEV., INCREASING HOUSING 
OPPORTUNITY IN NEW YORK CITY: THE CASE FOR INCLUSIONARY HOUSING 39 
(2006), available at http://www.prattcenter.net/pubs/izreport.pdf [hereinafter 
PRATT, INCLUSIONARY]. 
26 See RIIS, supra note 1, at 223–24. Generally speaking, the 421-a 
program was started in 1971 and now grants real-estate developers tax 
exemptions on their property in exchange for creating certain levels of affordable-
housing. See infra Parts I and II. 
27 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a (McKinney 2007). 
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In August 2007, the 421-a program was reauthorized with 
several new amendments.28 The revised program took effect on 
December 28, 2007, and will be reexamined in 2010.29 On his 
approval, former Governor Eliot Spitzer announced that the new 
legislation “[w]ill . . . [m]ore effectively promote the construction 
of affordable housing in the neighborhoods that need it most . . . 
[and] will build on our efforts to solve the housing crisis that has 
pushed too many working New Yorkers out of the middle class and 
prevented those struggling . . . from economic security.”30 
As evidenced by the former Governor’s remarks, three 
objectives drive the 421-a program.31 Two objectives, “decent 
shelter” and “wealth creation” for recipients in the form of lower 
rent and retained earnings, remain explicit programmatic objectives; 
implicit in the program, though, is a third objective: the “efficient 
use of public funds” in terms of balancing the costs, financial and 
otherwise, to the public with the benefits.32 Supporters laud the 
new measures as providing vital and innovative tools to increase 
the availability of affordable units and meet the increasing 
demand.33 Critics, however, question the efficacy of the tax 
abatement program altogether and cast the new law as nothing but a 
giveaway to developers at the public’s expense.34 
                                                           
28 Press Release, Governor Elliot Spitzer, Governor Spitzer Signs Bill to 
Reform NYC Tax Exemption for Housing Development (Aug. 24, 2007), 
available at http://www.ny.gov/governor/press/0824072.html [hereinafter 
Spitzer]. 
29 “As required by State law, the changes [made by the City] will go into 
effect one year from the effective date of the legislation.” Press Release, Mayor 
Michael Bloomberg, Mayor Bloomberg Will Sign Compromise Bill to Reform 
421-a Tax Incentive Program Into Law (Dec. 20, 2006), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/html/pr2006/pr-12-20-06.shtml. 
30 Spitzer, supra note 28. 
31 Byrne & Diamond, supra note 13, at 531 (“[There are] eight possible 
objectives of subsidized housing . . . : 1) decent shelter; 2) wealth creation; 3) 
social integration; 4) urban vitality; 5) civic engagement; 6) training; 7) 
institution building; and 8) efficient use of public funds.”). 
32 Id. 
33 See Spitzer, supra note 28. 
34 See, e.g., PRATT CTR. FOR COMMUNITY DEV., UNDERSTANDING THE 
NYC “421-A” PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION PROGRAM 6, available at 
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This Note will examine the 421-a program, its intended effects, 
and whether the new measures are indeed crafted to increase the 
availability of affordable housing and meet the increasing demand 
more effectively. Part I presents a history of 421-a legislation, 
discusses its evolution over the past four decades, and outlines 
what it has accomplished. Part II explores the newly passed 
legislation and compares the previous version of 421-a to the 
current one. Finally, Part III analyzes the efficacy of the new 
program in light of its policy goals. Ultimately, this Note will argue 
that while the amended 421-a program contains positive 
substantive changes, it nevertheless fails to effectively promote 
affordable housing construction and instead continues to grant 
incentives for any housing construction. 
Other City programs that advance affordable housing 
notwithstanding, the 421-a program in a large part retains its 
original 1985 framework and its focus on creating incentives for 
developers. As a result, scarce public funds will continue to be 
used inefficiently: limited “decent shelter” will be constructed, and 
“wealth creation”35 for families earning low-income will necessarily 
continue to be hampered. Further, the inherent tensions36 and 
tradeoffs between the program’s twin goals of housing 
development and affordable housing construction, as well as 
between its three policy objectives—decent shelter, wealth 
creation, and efficient use of public funds—will continue to 
undermine the very policies the program purports to serve. These 
programmatic imbalances will prevent the 421-a program from 
becoming a truly powerful and forward-looking affordable housing 
creation mechanism. 
                                                           
http://www.habitatnyc.org/pdf/advocate/Pratt421a.pdf [hereinafter PRATT, 
UNDERSTANDING]. While the new amendments build on the 421-a program, 
these and other critics nevertheless contend that more stringent requirements 
regarding affordable housing creation should, and could, have been adopted 
without harming the City’s real estate market. See infra Part II. 
35 Byrne and Diamond define housing subsidies as “wealth creation” 
because they “aim to alleviate poverty [by] transferring resources to the recipient 
in the form of less expensive housing rather than cash.” Byrne & Diamond, 
supra note 13, at 541. 
36 Byrne & Diamond, supra note 13, at 561 (“[T]ensions among goals of 
decent housing and other social benefits are endemic in subsidized housing.”). 
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I. HISTORY OF THE 421-A PROGRAM TO 2006 
A. The 421-a Program: 1971-1985 
1. Context and Legislation 
As originally conceived, the 421-a program had nothing to do 
with enhancing affordable housing opportunities.37 When Mayor 
John Lindsay received state legislative approval of the first 421-a 
provision in 1971,38 New York City was a vastly different place 
than it is today. The City was experiencing a weak housing market 
and was in the midst of a fiscal crisis.39 It had recently lost close to 
90,000 jobs.40 In addition, 1970 marked the beginning of a decade-
long population decline that would see more than 10% of its seven 
million residents flee.41 Mayor Lindsay’s 421-a program was 
                                                           
37 See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a (McKinney 1971) (amended 
2007). No mention of affordable housing is made in the original legislation. 
38 NEW YORK CITY DEP’T OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV., RECOMMENDATIONS 
OF THE 421-A TASK FORCE 1 (2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/ 
html/hpd/downloads/pdf/421ataskforcereporfinal4.pdf [hereinafter HPD, TASK 
FORCE]. The City’s power to enact local law is “derived from the New York 
State Constitution, Article IX, as implemented by, and spelled out in, the 
Municipal Home Rule Law.” However, a local law related to a “state concern” 
such as housing may not be adopted unless “authorized specifically by the 
Municipal Home Rule Law . . . or unless the State Legislature has specifically 
granted such power to the City.” NEW YORK STATE DEP’T OF STATE, REVISING 
CITY CHARTERS IN NEW YORK STATE 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.celdf.org/NewYorkHomeRuleandMunicipalGovernment/tabid/295/D
efault.aspx (follow “Revising City Charters” hyperlink) [hereinafter DOS, 
REVISING]. 
39 PRATT CTR. FOR COMMUNITY DEV., REFORMING NEW YORK CITY’S 
421-a PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION PROGRAM: SUBSIDIZE AFFORDABLE HOMES, 
NOT LUXURY DEVELOPMENT 2 (2006), available at http://www.prattcenter. 
net/pubs/PrattCenter-NY421-aReport.pdf [hereinafter PRATT, SUBSIDIZE]. 
40 Emanuel Perlmutter, Metropolitan Area Loses 88,000 Jobs in a Year, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1971, at A1. 
41 OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMPTROLLER, POPULATION TRENDS 
IN NEW YORK STATE’S CITIES 7 (2004), available at http://www.osc.state.ny. 
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intended as an opt-in program for developers to stimulate 
construction during an economic recession by promoting new 
construction of any multi-family housing developments through the 
use of tax abatements to developers, regardless of whether they 
were affordable or market-rate.42 
Specifically, new residential construction of multi-family 
homes on vacant or underutilized land was granted a full “tax 
exemption on the increased value during the period of construction 
and for 10 years thereafter.”43 For example, a developer who 
purchased property for $1 million and developed a building worth 
$10 million on the land would only be taxed on the $1 million initial 
investment and not on the $9 million in improvements.44 One 
stipulation of the 421-a program, however, provided benefits to the 
public as well: 421-a residential units had to be leased at 85% of 
market-rate rents and were subject to rent stabilization for the 
duration of the exemption.45 As a result, apartments in a building 
developed under the 421-a program could only be leased at a 
                                                           
us/localgov/pubs/research/pop_trends.pdf. 
42 HPD, TASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 1 (“421-a was initially established 
in an environment of declining property values and a dearth of development 
activity. The incentive was intended to stimulate new development during a 
period of slow housing production and declining population citywide.”). The 
program was not mandatory; if a developer determined that it was a better 
business decision to build without taking advantage of the 421-a tax incentive, 
they could still do so. 
43 CITIZENS HOUSING AND PLANNING COUNCIL, A PROPOSAL TO 
ENHANCE TAX AND ZONING INCENTIVES FOR NEW HOUSING PRODUCTION 5 
(2002), available at http://www.chpcny.org/pdf/taxincent.pdf [hereinafter CHPC, 
ENHANCE]. One generic example of underutilized land is an office or apartment 
building that is only at 50% capacity and, as such, is not being used as 
efficiently as possible. Jeremy Miller, Filling New York’s ‘Vacancies’, GOTHAM 
GAZETTE, Jan. 7, 2008, available at http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/ 
issueoftheweek/20080107/200/2394. 
44 NEW YORK CITY INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE, IBO FISCAL BRIEF, WORTH 
THE COST? EVALUATING THE 421-A PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION 2 (2003), 
available at http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/421aTaxFiscalBrief.pdf 
[hereinafter IBO, FISCAL]. 
45 Id. at 5. Rent stabilization refers to rent being frozen at a specific amount 
for the duration of the tax exemption. See infra notes 106–15 and accompanying 
text. 
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maximum of 85% of the full market value of the apartment.46 
While the original 1971 version of the 421-a program was not 
intended to be an engine for affordable housing, it had one implicit 
objective similar to that of later versions of the program that were 
explicitly focused on affordable housing: the efficient use of public 
funds by the balancing of interests involved.47 The original 421-a 
program attempted to create more housing in the City and energize 
the economy, while at the same time foregoing a certain amount of 
tax revenue that would otherwise be collected for public use.48 
2. Tax Abatements and Exemptions 
The use of tax abatements (taxes that are incrementally scaled 
in) and exemptions (complete tax avoidance) as motivators for 
economic development is relatively straightforward: with reduced 
or entirely avoided taxes, a significant portion of the costs 
associated with developing and managing the property will be 
offset, thus inducing developers to build.49 Tax exemptions remove 
all tax liability for a given period, while tax abatements encourage 
housing production by “providing a declining exemption on the 
new value that is created” by the development.50 
Under a tax abatement (or “partial tax exemption”) scheme, the 
                                                           
46 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(1) (McKinney 1971) (amended 
2007) (“Rents to be charged upon initial occupancy . . . shall be at least fifteen 
percent less than the rents prevailing for comparable [units].”). 
47 See Byrne & Diamond, supra note 13, at 531. 
48 See PRATT, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 34, at 4. 
49 Indeed, tax incentives “have long been a tool to both redistribute wealth 
and to inhibit uses or behavior that the government seeks to suppress.” The 
Future of Section 421-a of the Real Property Tax Law and Affordable Housing 
Development: Public Hearing on REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a Before the 
Assembl. Standing Comm. on Housing, 2007 Leg., 230th Sess. 146 (N.Y. 
2007) [hereinafter Public Hearing] (statement of Jerilyn Perine, Executive 
Director of the Citizens Housing and Planning Council) (on file with the 
author). 
50 New York City Department of Finance, Tax Reduction & Rebate 
Programs, http://home2.nyc.gov/html/dof/html/property/property_tax_reduc_tax 
reductions.shtml (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). Thus, by matching such tax 
“credits” against tax liabilities, a developer’s overall property tax is reduced. Id. 
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taxes that a developer must pay are slowly phased in over a 
number of years.51 Abatements are then another way to “ensure 
that a property owner’s costs are not increased as a result of the 
improvements by deferring the increased property taxes which 
result from improvement-related increases in property values.”52 
B. 1985–2006: Affordable Housing Production as a 
Concurrent Goal of 421-a 
Between 1971 and 1984, approximately 200,000 new housing 
units were created in the City;53 nine percent of those, or 18,000 
apartments, were financed under the 421-a exemption.54 
Notwithstanding the rather limited use of 421-a, there was a 
growing consensus that the costs were outweighing the benefits, 
rendering the program inefficient.55 First and foremost was the 
concern that the tax exemption program was unjustifiably 
advantageous to luxury developers and that communities in 
Northern Manhattan and the outer boroughs were not benefiting 
enough under the law.56 In response, the New York State 
Legislature endorsed a 1985 City Council proposal that 
transformed the program, thereby grafting another policy goal to 
the program’s original objective.57 
No longer would 421-a simply encourage new housing 
construction in the City; now, it would also “ensure that a portion 
                                                           
51 Id. (“[The 421-a program provides] a declining exemption on the new 
value created by the improvement.”). 
52 Melvyn R. Durchslag, Property Tax Abatement For Low-Income 
Housing: An Idea Whose Time May Never Arrive, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS., 367–
69 (1993). 
53 See NEW YORK CITY RENT GUIDELINES BD., 2007 HOUSING SUPPLY 
REPORT 14 (2007), available at www.housingnyc.com/downloads/research/pdf_ 
reports/07HSR.pdf [hereinafter 2007 HSR]. 
54 Under IBO calculations, 421-a has helped finance construction of 87,000 
apartments since 1971. Since 1985, roughly 69,000 units were created under 
421-a. Thus, between 1971 and 1985, 18,000 units were created under the 
program. See IBO, FISCAL, supra note 44, at 1, 4. 
55 See PRATT, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 34, at 4. 
56 CHPC, ENHANCE, supra note 43, at 5. 
57 Id. 
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of new[, multifamily] housing [would] be ‘affordable’ to low- and 
moderate-income New Yorkers.”58 As a result, 421-a encapsulated 
two more objectives traditionally seen in affordable housing 
programs—decent shelter (i.e., new or updated apartments), and 
wealth creation (i.e., a reduced rent burden), that would be 
specifically targeted at families earning low-income wages.59 
1. Defining “Affordable” Housing and “Low-Income”:         
Area Median Income 
One of the priorities the post-1985 421-a statute advances is 
affordable housing production for individuals and families earning 
low-income.60 These essential terms, though, are defined in various 
ways depending on the particular policy goals of a given program. 
Both federal and local determinations of what is “affordable” for a 
given locale rely in part on equations involving Area Median 
Income (“AMI”), which is calculated by the United States 
Department of Housing of Urban Development.61 AMI represents 
the median income for a geographic region over a given year,62 and 
is used to set maximum income limits for various affordable 
housing programs.63 
The use and reliance on AMI in the calculations of affordability 
will depend on programmatic policy goals. For instance, the federal 
government defines “affordable” rent as that which does “not 
exceed 30[%] of the adjusted income of a family [of four] whose 
income equals 65[%] of the [AMI] for the area.”64 By contrast, the 
                                                           
58 IBO, FISCAL, supra note 44, at 2. 
59 Byrne & Diamond, supra note 13, at 531. 
60 IBO, FISCAL, supra note 44, at 2. 
61 DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FY2007 HUD INCOME LIMITS 
BRIEFING MATERIAL 15 (2007), available at http://www.huduser.org/datasets/ 
il/il07/IncomeLimitsBriefingMaterial.pdf [hereinafter HUD, INCOME]. 
62 Id. at 8–9. 
63 IBO, FISCAL, supra note 44, at 2–3. This includes the negotiated 
certificates developers can elect to purchase through the 421-a program and the 
base rents for on-site affordable housing. Id. 
64 Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 12745(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2000). 
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City65 ultimately defined affordable rent for a family of four as not 
exceeding 30% of 80% AMI, resulting in less eligible recipients 
than the traditional federal definition would have allowed because 
of a higher income threshold.66 
While the AMI appears to be a straightforward calculation, the 
geographic area that it considers has a substantial impact on the 
resulting definition of affordability.67 Significantly, the geographic 
region that is used to calculate the City’s AMI includes not only 
the five boroughs that comprise the City, but also wealthier 
surrounding counties including Nassau, Suffolk, Putnam and 
Richmond.68 This boosts the stated AMI for the New York 
metropolitan area to $70,900,69 even though in the true median 
income in the five boroughs is only $43,434, and even less 
depending on particular boroughs or neighborhoods within 
boroughs.70 
This HUD-defined AMI is a controlling variable in the 421-a 
program.71 Since HUD’s AMI calculation is crucial in determining 
                                                           
65 The 421-a program did not specifically define affordability in the law. 
The pre-2007 statute merely stated that within certain boundaries, tax incentives 
would be granted only if “twenty percent of the units [were] affordable to 
families of low and moderate income.” N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(2) 
(McKinney 2005); NEW YORK CITY, CODE § 11-245(b)(2) (2006). 
66 See IBO, FISCAL, supra note 44, at 3 (“[F]or the affordable units built in 
80/20 projects . . . incomes cannot exceed 80 percent of the area median income, 
and rent is set at 30 percent of that ceiling.”). 
67 See generally, N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a (McKinney 2007). 
For instance, section (7)(c)(i) states that “not less than twenty percent of the 
units . . . must . . . be affordable to . . . families whose incomes . . . do not 
exceed sixty percent of the area median incomes . . . .” (emphasis added). The 
current 421-a statute contains many such references to area median income. § 
421-a. 
68 DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FY2007 AREA DEFINITIONS REPORT 
30 (2007), http://www.huduser.org/datasets/il/il07/Area_Definitions_Report.pdf. 
69 HUD currently calculates the AMI for the New York City metropolitan 
area as $70,900 for a family of four. HUD, NEW YORK, supra note 2. 
70 FURMAN, HOUSING, supra note 8, at 3. 
71 See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(1)(a)(ii)(C)(b) (McKinney 
1985) (amended 2007) (providing that tax exemptions were not available within 
certain areas unless the Department of Housing Preservation and Development, 
which used the HUD-defined AMI as its benchmark “had certified that twenty 
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the maximum allowable income a family can make and still be 
eligible for 421-a rent stabilized apartments, the HUD definition of 
“low-income” becomes a fundamental variable as well.72 HUD 
defines “low-income households” as those households that do not 
earn more than 80% of the median family income for a four-person 
family.73 Thus, “low-income” for the City, and for the 421-a 
program, is currently calculated to be $56,700.74 As noted above, 
though, this low-income calculation inaccurately reflects the reality 
in the City because it takes into account wealthier surrounding 
areas. 
2. The 421-a Program: 1985-2006 
Two substantive elements particularly distinguished the 1985 
law and its subsequent amendments from the original 421-a plan 
and illustrated the Legislature’s shift from merely encouraging 
market rate housing projects to specifically stimulating affordable 
development. First was the creation of the Geographic Exclusion 
Area (“exclusion zone”), an area within which developers seeking 
to build had to meet additional requirements tied to affordable 
housing production in order to be eligible for a tax benefit.75 Second 
was the correlation of the duration of the tax exemption to specific 
                                                           
percent of the units [would] be affordable to families of low and moderate 
income”). 
72 Id. The same holds true for more recent versions of the 421-a program. 
See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(7)(c)(1) (McKinney 2007) 
(“[Providing no tax incentives in certain areas unless] twenty percent of the 
units in the multiple dwelling must . . . be affordable to and occupied or 
available for occupancy by individuals or families whose incomes at the time of 
initial occupancy do not exceed sixty percent of the area median incomes 
adjusted for family size . . . .”). 
73 HUD, INCOME, supra note 61, at 1. 
74 “Very-low-income” is defined as not exceeding 50% of the AMI. HUD, 
INCOME, supra note 61, at 1. Given the City AMI, “very low-income” is 
currently $35,450 for a family of four. HUD, NEW YORK, supra note 2, at 1. 
75 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(7) (McKinney 2007) (“[B]enefits of 
this section shall not be available for new multiple dwellings located in a 
geographic exclusion area . . . unless they comply with the provisions of this 
subdivision . . . .”). 
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area, thereby creating greater incentives for developers to develop 
housing in certain locations over others.76 
a. Geographic Exclusion Area—On-Site Development or 
Negotiable Certificates 
To ensure that developers did not simply develop under the 
421-a program in areas with the highest market-rate value, 
legislators sectioned off an area within which developers could not 
take advantage of 421-a “as-of-right,” referred to as the “exclusion 
zone.”77 Certain restrictions were applied to developers looking to 
build within that area to ensure that any developments in the 
exclusion zone would add a net benefit to the goal of affordable 
housing. The exclusion zone encompassed approximately the 
middle portion of Manhattan and was comprised of neighborhoods 
that were traditionally strong housing markets in the City.78 The 
exclusion zone was roughly circumscribed by Ninety-Sixth Street 
as the northern boundary, Fourteenth Street as the southeastern 
boundary, and Houston Street as the southwestern boundary.79 
Outside the exclusion zone, developers were still granted tax 
incentives as-of-right—whether or not they built affordable 
housing units—and rent was generally set by the market-rate for 
the area.80 Within the exclusion zone, though, developers were no 
longer granted benefits “as-of-right,” but instead had to meet one of 
two conditions in order to take advantage of the tax benefits: either 
                                                           
76 Between 1985 and 2006, the New York State Legislature made several 
technical revisions to the 421-a program. However, the basic framework of the 
law remained largely unchanged. Where substantive changes were made post-
1985, those changes will be addressed. See CHPC, ENHANCE, supra note 43, at 
5. 
77 See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(7) (McKinney 2007). 
78 HPD, TASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 2. 
79 Department of Housing Preservation and Development 421-a Geographic 
Exclusion Zone Map, available at www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/downloads/pdf/421a-
GEA-Final.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2008) [hereinafter GEA Map]. 
80 HPD, TASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 2. Areas outside of the exclusion 
zone were not as potentially lucrative as areas within the zone given market-rates 
for the middle section of Manhattan were generally higher than that of upper 
Manhattan and the outer boroughs. Id. 
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designating one-fifth of on-site units as affordable for individuals 
and families earning low-income wages,81 or contributing to 
affordable housing elsewhere by purchasing negotiable certificates 
from off-site affordable housing developers, in effect “buying” the 
tax incentive.82 Since the total amount of subsidies a developer 
could accumulate was unlimited,83 an exclusion zone developer 
could hypothetically accumulate enough certificates to completely 
offset their development.84 
Under the first, on-site option, developers building under 421-a 
had to set aside 20% of the units in the development to families 
earning no more than $56,700.85 Additionally, developers could 
only charge $17,010 per year in rent for those affordable units.86 
Under the second, negotiable certificate option,87 market-rate 
developers seeking to build only market-rate units within the 
exclusion zone could purchase transferable real estate tax abatement 
certificates from affordable housing developers building outside the 
exclusion zone.88 This negotiable certificate option allowed market-
rate developers within the exclusion zone to indirectly increase the 
City’s affordable housing stock by financing the construction of 
affordable housing units in other parts of the City, outside the 
                                                           
81 This conditional incentive is also known as an “80/20” market-
rate/affordable-rate mix; 20% of the units must be marketed to those earning low-
income wages, while the other 80% can be market-rate. PRATT, SUBSIDIZE, 
supra note 39, at 3. Slightly different conditions apply to the Greenpoint-
Williamsburg exclusion areas. HPD, TASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 4. 
82 IBO, FISCAL, supra note 44, at 3. 
83 COMPTROLLER, OVERVIEW, supra note 4, at 3. 
84 See HPD, TASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 6. 
85 This $56,700 benchmark currently represents 80% AMI. N.Y. REAL 
PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(2)(b) (McKinney 2005); HUD, NEW YORK, supra 
note 2, at 1. 
86 See IBO, FISCAL, supra note 44, at 3. Yearly rent was limited to 
$17,010 in those affordable units because the yearly rent could not exceed 30% 
of the low-income threshold of $56,700. Id. 
87 This program is known as the Affordable Housing Program (“AHP”). 
NEW YORK CITY DEP’T OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV., OVERVIEW OF 421-A 
PROGRAMS (2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/downloads/pdf/ 
421aoverviewtfreport.pdf [hereinafter HPD, OVERVIEW]. 
88 See HPD, TASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 4. 
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exclusion zone.89 
Affordable housing developers outside of the exclusion zone 
used the proceeds of the certificate sales to generate construction 
capital for their own projects.90 The number of certificates a 
market-rate developer could obtain from an affordable housing 
developer was dictated by the particular AMI ceiling for the 
particular affordable housing project.91 In return for helping to fund 
affordable housing projects outside the exclusion zone, each 
purchased certificate allowed a market-rate developer to receive the 
benefits of the tax incentives provided by the 421-a program on 
one new, market-rate apartment within the exclusion zone, without 
being impeded by rent regulations.92 Over the life of the tax 
abatement, the certificate was “worth, on average, over $100,000 
in . . . tax benefits to [the developer for] each market-rate unit in 
the exclusion zone.”93 In this way, developers derived benefits not 
only from abated property taxes, but also from higher-fetched 
rental prices because they did not have to set aside on-site 
affordable units.94 
Given the lucrative market inside the exclusion zone, many 
market-rate real estate developers decried this innovation in 
particular because they saw it as encroaching on their assumed as-
                                                           
89 Id. 
90 See PRATT, SUBSIDIZE, supra note 39, at 4; IBO, FISCAL, supra note 
44, at 2–3. 
91 Non-exclusion area units rented to families earning 60% AMI ($42,540) 
yielded five certificates for market-rate developers, whereas units rented to 
families earning between 60% and 100% AMI yielded only four certificates. 
HPD, OVERVIEW, supra note 87. 
92 HPD, TASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 8. Essentially, each certificate 
bought by the market-rate developer permitted him to develop one market-rate 
unit within the exclusion zone while still receiving the tax benefits under 421-a. 
Market-rate developers had the opportunity to purchase varying amounts of 
certificates depending on the type of affordable housing that was being indirectly 
financed. Id. 
93 Id. “The certificate program thus leverages only between 15% and 20% 
of the value of the tax benefit for affordable housing.” Id. at 8. 
94 Peter Iverson, Linking 421a to Low-Income Housing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
17, 1989, § 10, at 1. 
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of-right ability to develop.95 Before the 1985 amendments were 
enacted, the President of the Real Estate Board of New York 
fretted, “Almost no rental buildings would be constructed [under 
the plan because it will] stop what little rental housing is being 
produced . . . . Almost all the rental housing being produced is 
within the [proposed exclusion zone].”96 
Nevertheless, the exclusion zone provision was approved. 
Because the vast majority of all 421-a subsidies were provided to 
high-end developments below 96th Street, “the city need[ed] to 
focus its attention on how to encourage [low-income unit] 
construction . . . . There [were] huge areas in the other boroughs 
that need[ed] housing” and an exclusion zone was able to help meet 
that need.97 Indeed, the exclusionary zone gained favor as it 
continued, enough so that almost twenty years later, it was further 
expanded to include other quickly gentrifying areas such as the 
Greenpoint-Williamsburg waterfront in Brooklyn and Hudson 
Yards.98 
b. Duration of Tax Incentives Correlated to Geographic Area 
In addition to the creation of the exclusion zone, the post-1985 
amendments also extended the duration of the tax incentive period, 
but the length of the additional period would depend on the section 
of the City in which construction occurred.99 These provisions 
                                                           
95 The developers’ basic contention was that the exclusion zone under 421-
a would necessarily “dampen development if they reduce developer return 
expectations below certain thresholds so that developers choose to abstain from 
building or are unable to obtain financing to permit development.” JERRY J. 
SALAMA, MICHAEL H. SCHILL & JONATHAN SPRINGER, FURMAN CTR. FOR 
REAL ESTATE & URBAN POL’Y, REDUCING THE COST OF NEW HOUSING 
CONSTRUCTION IN NEW YORK CITY: 2005 UPDATE, at 100 (2005), available at 
http://furmancenter.nyu.edu/CREUP_Papers/cost_study_2005/CostStudy_intro.
html. 
96 The Week In Review, A Debate; The Controversy Over Tax Breaks, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21 1984, § 4, at 6. 
97 Id. (quoting Ruth Messinger, City Council Member). 
98 HPD, TASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 4. 
99 See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW §§ 421-a(1)(a)(ii)(C); 421-
a(1)(a)(iii)(C) (McKinney 1985) (providing for various exemption periods 
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effectively encouraged developers to develop more general housing 
in the outer boroughs in exchange for longer extended tax-exempt 
periods in order to recoup more of their initial development 
money.100 
Specifically, inside the exclusion zone, developers building 20% 
affordable housing units on-site would receive a twenty-year 
abatement.101 Those developers who chose instead to build market-
rate units within the exclusion zone and purchase off-site 
negotiable certificates would receive a shorter, ten-year 
abatement.102 However, those builders outside of the exclusion 
zone would reap even more benefits. In most of the rest of the 
City, including areas north of 110th Street in Manhattan, the 
Bronx, Brooklyn,103 Queens or Staten Island, developers would 
receive a fifteen-year as-of-right tax abatement for any housing 
construction.104 Further, if developers included 20% affordable 
housing units north of 110th Street or in the outer boroughs, they 
were eligible for an extended twenty-five year tax abatement.105 
                                                           
depending on the location of the development). 
100 Id. 
101 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(2)(a)(iv) (McKinney 2005); 
PRATT, SUBSIDIZE, supra note 39, at 4. This created an all-or-nothing incentive 
for developers in that they could only take advantage of the 421-a tax exemption 
by building 20% affordable housing. 
102 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(2)(a)(i) (McKinney 2005); PRATT, 
SUBSIDIZE, supra note 39, at 2. 
103 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(2)(a)(ii) (McKinney 2005). With 
the exception of the Greenpoint-Williamsburg waterfront. PRATT, SUBSIDIZE, 
supra note 39, at 4. 
104 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(2)(a)(iii) (McKinney 2005); 
PRATT, SUBSIDIZE, supra note 39, at 4. The loopholes inherent in the 
negotiable certificate system, see infra notes 125–36 and accompanying text, 
created a situation where developers were able to take advantage of tax benefits 
without significantly increasing the stock of affordable housing. Although the 
system likely could have been revised to be made effective, it was nevertheless 
cut from the 421-a program in 2007. See infra notes 190–200 and accompanying 
text. 
105 PRATT, SUBSIDIZE, supra note 39, at 4. 
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c. Rent Stabilization 
While the goal of the post-1985 amendments was to increase 
affordable housing in the City, the amendments did nothing to 
regulate the pricing of permanent housing.106 Rentals, however, 
were stringently regulated: all initial rents for rental units built 
within the exemption period, whether affordable or not, were based 
on area market-value.107 To ensure that eligible families could afford 
monthly rent, affordable units within the exclusion zone were 
further regulated so that rents could not exceed 30% of 80% 
AMI.108 For example, if rent for a market-rate apartment in the 
exclusion zone was $3,000 per month, or $36,000 per year, then 
rent for a 421-a affordable unit in the same zone could not exceed 
30% of the low-income threshold ($56,700, representing 80% 
AMI), or $1,417 per month. 
After the end of the tax abatement period, developers had more 
freedom to increase rent for market-rate units than for the 
affordable units.109 As tax abatements were slowly being phased 
out, developers were allowed to increase rent on market-rate units 
by 2.2% each year.110 Once any given developer lost his tax 
incentive, however, and had to begin paying increased taxes, rent 
was no longer stabilized by the government, and could immediately 
rise to actual market rate.111 
While affordable units were more protected even after a 
developer exhausted their tax incentive period, they were not 
wholly insulated from increased rent.112 Developers were free to 
incrementally increase the rent of affordable units to market rate 
                                                           
106 Id. Specifically, there were no limits on the price for those purchasing 
apartments in newly built condominiums or co-ops. Id. 
107 CHPC, ENHANCE, supra note 43, at 10. 
108 Id. 
109 IBO, FISCAL, supra note 44, at 2 (“As exemptions expire, rents may 
rise to market rates.”). 
110 CHPC, ENHANCE, supra note 43, at 10. 
111 Id. 
112 See IBO, FISCAL, supra note 44, at 2 (“[U]nits designated as affordable 
remain rent stabilized for at least 20 years, [but] rents may only be increased to 
market rates upon vacancy.”). 
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only after the given tax exemption ran its course—and the length of 
the rent stabilization was dependent on the occupants of such 
apartments.113 Specifically, if the unit was built after Fiscal Year 
1985 had started, rent stabilization “continue[d] until the end of 
the last lease signed while the benefit period was in effect.”114 If the 
unit was built before Fiscal Year 1985, though, rent stabilization 
“continue[d] until the first vacancy occurs after the expiration of 
the tax benefits, even if the vacancy occurs long after the tax 
benefits have expired.”115 
4. Gauging 421-a’s Accomplishments: 1985–2006 
While the goals of the revised 421-a plan were ambitious, the 
lack of any systematic data regarding the outcomes of the 421-a 
program makes it difficult to evaluate its effects from 1985 to 
2006.116 Based on the available information, however, it appears 
that while the program certainly encouraged new housing 
production in general, it was not as successful in accomplishing its 
second, more crucial goal of providing additional affordable 
housing. 
a. Overall New Housing Production 
Between 1985 and 2006, approximately 260,500 housing units 
were developed throughout the City.117 Of these new units, 
approximately 92,000, or 35%, were built under the various 421-a 
                                                           
113 See New York City Rent Guidelines Board, http://www.housingnyc. 
com/html/resources/zip.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2008). For example, if an 
affordable unit was built in 1988 in an area with a 20-year tax abatement period, 
rent was frozen until 2008 plus any additional time that was created by a lease 
signed within that abatement period. As soon as the lease ended, though, the 
developer was permitted to incrementally increase the rent to 2008 market-rate 
prices. As a result, the families living in such apartments at the end of a tax 
abatement period would experience rising rent. See id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 See PRATT, INCLUSIONARY, supra note 25, at 39. 
117 See 2007 HSR, supra note 53, at 14. This figure represents a sizeable 
increase in the housing stock of the City. Id. 
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programs; the other 65% were built without utilizing the 
program.118 Developers choose not to build under 421-a for various 
reasons. Oftentimes, they were ineligible under the program 
because of where, or what, they were building.119 Others simply 
chose not to build under 421-a for economic reasons.120 While it is 
impossible to determine how many developers would have built in 
the absence of the program, the program’s maximum effectiveness 
in terms of sheer unit creation reached its peak in 1988.121 
Subsequent effectiveness fell substantially in the late-1980s and 
1990s, largely in part to a declining real estate market in the 
City.122 Although this trend reversed and there was considerable 
rejuvenation in both the housing market in general and in 421-a 
development specifically in the late 1990s and early 2000s,123 the 
program was once again on the decline by 2005.124 
b. Affordable Housing Creation 
Of the 92,000 units created under 421-a, only a small fraction 
of these were found to be affordable.125 One study found that 
between 1985 and 2002, “only 8% (4,905) of the . . . units 
                                                           
118 See id. at 16. 
119 PRATT, SUBSIDIZE, supra note 39, at 7. For example, if a developer was 
only building market-rate units in the exclusion zone and was not interested in 
the negotiable certificate program, or if a developer was building a parking lot, 
they each would not be eligible for incentives under the 421-a program. Id. 
120 Id. For example, a developer could determine that he could make more 
money simply from charging market-rate rents than from receiving tax benefits 
for setting aside affordable units or purchasing negotiable certificates. 
121 NEW YORK CITY RENT GUIDELINES BD., 1997 HOUSING SUPPLY 
REPORT 4 (1997), available at http://www.housingnyc.com/downloads/research/ 
pdf_reports/97hsr.pdf. 
122 NEW YORK CITY RENT GUIDELINES BD., RENT STABILIZED HOUSING 
IN NEW YORK CITY: A SUMMARY OF RENT GUIDELINES BOARD RESEARCH 64 
(1991), available at http://www.housingnyc.com/downloads/research/pdf_ 
reports/91book.pdf. 
123 2007 HSR, supra note 53, at 13. 
124 Id. at 16. 
125 See 2007 HSR, supra note 53, at 14; PRATT, SUBSIDIZE, supra note 
39, at 6. 
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subsidized through the 10-, 15- or 20-year 421-a 
programs . . . were affordable to low-or moderate-income 
families.”126 Even those “affordable units” created under the 
program were still out of reach for many financially limited families 
given the program’s definitions and calculations of affordability.127 
Moreover, the difficulty of ensuring affordable unit creation may 
be explained by the availability and prevalence of negotiable 
certificates, as well as loopholes in the program that worked to the 
advantage of developers.128 
Within the exclusion zone, developers were much more likely 
to purchase negotiable certificates than to designate 20% of their 
on-site units affordable.129 Choosing otherwise would have in effect 
limited the rent in those units, and thus driven down profit. The 
certificates allowed developers to maximize profits by charging 
market-rate rents in all units while still benefiting from a 10-year 
tax exemption on some of their units.130 As sound as these business 
decisions may have been, however, they hardly increased the 
City’s affordable housing stock in a substantive way. While some 
28,000 market rate units built within the exclusion zone benefited 
from a 10-year 421-a exemption from 1985 to 2006, only 
approximately 5,500 affordable housing units were created outside 
the exclusion zone with the revenue generated from purchased 
negotiable certificates.131 
Moreover, there was simply more business incentive for 
market-rate developers. The benefits that market-rate developers 
gained, as opposed to those for off-site affordable-housing 
                                                           
126 PRATT, SUBSIDIZE, supra note 39, at 6. “Insufficient data is available 
on the 25-year exemption to determine affordability.” Id. 
127 See supra notes 60–74 and accompanying text. 
128 See HPD, TASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 8 (“[Negotiable certificates 
narrowed] participation in the affordable housing market and [led to a less] 
efficient allocation of limited resources.”). 
129 Indeed, in 2005, the 80/20 program created 2,100 affordable housing 
units in the exclusion zone, while almost 7,700 units were created outside the 
exclusion zone with negotiable certificates. COMPTROLLER, OVERVIEW, supra 
note 4, at 3–4. 
130 See PRATT, SUBSIDIZE, supra note 39, at 5. 
131 HPD, TASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 8. 
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developers, were highly skewed. Market-rate developers stood to 
realize five to ten times more benefits for simply purchasing 
negotiable certificates than any off-site affordable-housing 
developers could gain in terms of raising capital; prices for the 
certificates ranged from $11,000 to $20,000,132 yet in practice, one 
certificate was “worth, on average, over $100,000 in . . . tax 
benefits to [the developer for] each market-rate unit in” the 
exclusion zone.”133 As a result, the certificate program in fact only 
generated approximately one-fifth of the total value of the tax 
benefit to affordable housing projects.134 
While the majority of developers within the exclusionary zone 
therefore preferred to take advantage of the certification option, 
some developers chose instead to receive 20-year tax incentives by 
designating 20% of on-site units as affordable: from 1992 to 2003, 
6,782 units were created in the exclusion zone under this plan.135 
Nevertheless, the choice between on-site units or off-site financing 
often came down to simple economics: since “market rents [often] 
exceed[ed] the allowable rent for affordable units, even including 
the property tax exemption” for the entire project, it usually made 
more business sense to opt for financing off-site affordable 
housing.136 
c. 421-a Unit and Subsidy Concentration 
Further issues with 421-a are illustrated by the concentration of 
units in Manhattan built under the program. This concentration of 
units also resulted in a concentration of benefits to one borough. 
While a concentration of units is not necessarily harmful, it was 
decidedly not beneficial to those living in the outer boroughs.137 




135 See IBO, FISCAL, supra note 44, at 3–4. 
136 Id. at 4. 
137 The disproportionate distribution of benefits was arguably detrimental to 
the outer boroughs because the 421-a program did not provide a comparable 
amount of units or value of tax benefits to those living in the outer boroughs. 
See COMPTROLLER, OVERVIEW, supra note 4, at 3. 
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From 1985 to 2002, projects in Manhattan accounted for 53% 
(36,668) of the total number of all units, affordable and market-
rate, built under 421-a, with the other 47% distributed throughout 
the other four boroughs.138 By 2005, Manhattan developments had 
received “78% of all 421-a benefits but accounted for only 48% of 
units that received 421-a benefits.”139 Put simply, Manhattan 
developers were receiving the lion’s share of tax benefits under the 
program, even though their developments were disproportionately 
market-rate developments. Moreover, since developers could 
benefit from unlimited levels of 421-a tax incentives, 421-a 
developments in Manhattan also received the largest yearly 421-a 
subsidies, including some as high as $160,000 per unit.140 This 
trend was not only due to higher land costs in Manhattan relative 
to the other boroughs, but more importantly because the tax 
incentives were being used to subsidize large luxury units.141 The 
outer boroughs, in contrast, saw only a fraction of subsidies as 
compared to Manhattan, and far fewer units were created in the 
outer boroughs as well.142 
Outside of the exclusion zone, 421-a developments were 
mostly found to be concentrated in areas with rapidly growing 
populations, increasingly affluent socio-economic populations, or 
where there were “strong residential real estate markets”—or 
combinations of the above.143 Thus, while certain select pockets in 
                                                           
138 Queens realized 20% (13,909); Brooklyn realized 13%; (9,018); Staten 
Island realized 7.8% (5,405); and the Bronx realized only 5.5% (3,906). IBO, 
FISCAL, supra note 44, at 4. 
139 COMPTROLLER, OVERVIEW, supra note 4, at 2. 
140 Id. at 3 (“[P]er unit savings [in Trump World Tower] ranged as high as 
$160,000” and that such “deeply-subsidized [luxury] units had a market value of 
$4.2 billion.”). 
141 Id. at 2. 
142 Id. at 2–3. For example, in 2005, Manhattan received 78% 
($2,069,495,023) of the total 421-a exemption benefits for that yearalmost four 
times that of the other boroughs combined. In contrast, Brooklyn received the 
second-largest total 421-a exemption benefitsa mere 9% ($238,216,222). 
Queens, the Bronx, and Staten Island combined only received 13% of the 
benefits ($331,711,530). Id. 
143 Such areas included: Flushing, Queens, Greenpoint-Willimsburg, 
Brooklyn and Brighton Beach, Brooklyn. Id. at 3. 
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the outer boroughs benefited, low-income neighborhoods and the 
outer boroughs on the whole saw little increase in affordable 
housing under the 421-a program.144 Indeed, at least one 
commentator mused that the program was “far from trailblazing” 
and was “merely gilding a well-traveled road.”145 
d. Average Base Rent Under 421-a 
Yet another exposed flaw of the 421-a program was the fact 
that “affordable” apartments under 421-a were not always 
affordable to those the law intended to target. While there is scant 
data as to the extent of “affordability” of apartments built under 
421-a, one study estimated the average rents for a one-bedroom 
421-a apartment built over a three-year span, 1999 through 
2001.146 In the year of the study, AMI for the City was $62,800; 
low-income (80% AMI) was $50,250.147 The study showed that in 
Manhattan (primarily in the exclusion zone), the average initial 
base monthly rent for a 421-a market-rate one-bedroom apartment 
built within that timeframe was $3,172.148 Assuming a household 
spends 30% of its annual income on rent, this translates in to a 
“necessary annual income” of $126,864—225% above the AMI.149 
Indeed, since four out of five apartments built in the exclusion zone 
could be rented at market rate, these expensive apartments 
represented the vast majority of those receiving subsidies in the 
exclusion zone under 421-a.150 In essence, even though some 
affordable units were created within the exclusion zone or through 
                                                           
144 Id. 
145 PRATT, SUBSIDIZE, supra note 39, at 9. The contention was that the 
421-a program was in fact benefiting and encouraging a continued increase in 
market-rate housing rather than promoting affordable housing. Id. 
146 See IBO, FISCAL, supra note 44, at 5. 
147 DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HUD INCOME LIMITS 2002, at 1 
(2002), available at http://www.huduser.org/intercept.asp?loc=/Datasets/IL/ 
FMR02/hud02ny.pdf [hereinafter HUD INCOME LIMITS 2002]. 
148 IBO, FISCAL, supra note 44, at 5. 
149 Id. 
150 Only 20%, or 1 out of 5, on-site units were required to be affordable in 
order to receive the 20-year exemption. See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-
a(2)(a)(iv) (McKinney 2005) (amended 2007). 
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negotiable certificates, the program essentially ensured that 
developers could maximize their profits by seeking market-rate 
rents while simultaneously receiving tax benefits.151 
Given the $50,250 low-income threshold at the time of the 
study, monthly rent in a 421-a low-income apartment in 
Manhattan was approximately $1,256.152 This monthly rent would 
translate to a necessary annual income of $50,240—99% AMI. In 
short, these apartments would only be affordable for a family 
earning AMI, not to those families earning 80% AMI, let alone less 
than that. Moreover, since at most only one out of five exclusion 
zone 421-a apartments had such reduced rents, exclusion zone 
units such as these were likely few and far between.153 
Outside the exclusion zone under the 15- and 25-year 
exemptions, average rents for 421-a apartments were substantially 
lower.154 Even here, though, they were rarely affordable for families 
earning low income given that the initial rents were tied to the 
market rate for the area.155 As a result, the outer boroughs also 
generally showed that the program touted to create significant 
affordable housing was not living up to its potential. In Brooklyn, 
                                                           
151 See PRATT, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 34, at 4 (noting that the 421-
a program has only created a small amount of subsidized housing while 421-a 
benefits have “covered the boom of market-rate, luxury buildings in lower 
Manhattan . . . downtown Brooklyn, and Long Island City with little or no 
affordable units”). 
152 This approximate rent was found by making the following calculations: 
30% of 80% AMI ($50,250) = $15,075; as divided over 12 months = 
$1,256.25. See IBO, FISCAL, supra note 44, at 5; HUD INCOME LIMITS 2002, 
supra note 147, at 1. 
153 IBO, FISCAL, supra note 44, at 3. As data for 2002 shows, 10,879 units 
received tax exemptions within the exclusion zone in Manhattan under 421-a; 
4,097 units received 10-year exemptions (i.e., through negotiable certificates); 
6,782 received 20-year exemptions. Id. Assuming that none of the 10-year 
exempt units were renting at “affordable” rates, and developers only designated 
the statutory minimum of 20% of their 20-year exempt units as “affordable,” 
only 1,356 (12%) of these units were developed as affordable apartments. See id. 
154 This is because market rates for areas outside of the central core of 
Manhattan are lower. See NEW YORK CITY RENT GUIDELINES BD., 2007 
INCOME AND EXPENSE STUDY 7 (2007), available at http://www.housingnyc. 
com/downloads/research/pdf_reports/ie07.pdf. 
155 See IBO, FISCAL, supra note 44, at 5. 
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the average monthly rent for a 421-a subsidized unit ($2,077) 
translated into a necessary annual income of 147% AMI; the same 
apartment in Queens required a necessary annual income of 85% 
AMI.156 Since these units fall outside of the exclusion zone, there 
was no requirement that any be affordable to families earning low-
income wages, even though developers nevertheless benefited from 
the tax abatements.157 Only in the Bronx did average 421-a 
apartment rent prices even come close to being affordable—the 
average monthly 421-a apartment rent was $477, or 34% of the 
necessary annual income.158 Since market rates still determined the 
rent for 421-a units, many apartments were out of range for 
precisely those that the program was purportedly designed to 
benefit. 
e. Cost to Taxpayers of the 421-a Program (Tax Expenditure) 
As noted above, the basic economic principle behind the 421-a 
program is that a developer receives a tax exemption for every unit 
or building created under the program.159 The other side of this 
coin, though, is that the City foregoes what yearly property taxes 
it otherwise would have collected for every unit built under 421-
a.160 From 2001 through 2006, 421-a subsidies cost the City nearly 
$1.5 billion in tax expenditures.161 In 2006 alone, 421-a subsidies 
cost the City over $500 million in unrealized property taxes, 
resulting in the largest real estate tax expenditure program that 
year.162 Given the amount of benefits developers were receiving as 
                                                           
156 Id. 
157 See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(2)(a)(ii) (McKinney 2005) 
(any project in the outer boroughs is eligible for an as-of-right 15-year 
exemption). 
158 Id. 
159 See supra notes 37–48 and accompanying text. 
160 Id. 
161 See THE CITY OF NEW YORK DEP’T OF FIN. OFFICE OF TAX POL’Y, 
ANNUAL REPORTS ON TAX EXPENDITURES FISCAL YEARS 2001 THROUGH 2007, 
available at http://home2.nyc.gov/html/dof/html/pub/pub_reports_other_tax. 
shtml. 
162 Approximately 75,800 apartments received tax subsidies under the 
program in 2006. THE CITY OF NEW YORK DEP’T OF FIN. OFFICE OF TAX 
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compared to the amount of affordable housing produced, questions 
gradually began to emerge as to whether the costs of the program 
were outweighing the benefits, and, if so, how to best revise the 
program in order to realign it with its goals. 
II. AMENDING THE 421-A PROGRAM: ENACTED LEGISLATION IN 
2007 
In light of the City’s burgeoning population, strong housing 
market, and the need for more affordable housing for families 
earning low-income wages, it became apparent that the 421-a 
program had to change.163 Public funds were still being used 
inefficiently.164 Wealth was being created, though not necessarily 
for the intended recipients of the program.165 While more housing 
was indeed being created, the second policy goal of 421-a—
providing affordable housing—was still out of reach, and 
accordingly, the need for an overhaul of the 421-a program became 
evident by 2006.166 
A. Proposals for Change—Four Perspectives 
Recognizing this need, Mayor Bloomberg assembled a task 
force in early 2006 to explore potential options for reforming the 
program.167 Around the same time, several housing advocacy not-
for-profit organizations simultaneously began to independently 
lobby for progressive proposals to the 421-a program in hopes of 
influencing the pending City legislation. 
                                                           
POL’Y, ANNUAL REPORT ON TAX EXPENDITURES FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 20–21 
(2007), available at http://home2.nyc.gov/html/dof/html/pdf/07pdf/ter_2007_ 
final_rev12-28-07.pdf. 
163 See HPD, TASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 1 (“[T]he environment for 
housing development has changed dramatically. Our robust housing market 
provides an historic opportunity to strengthen the connection between the 421-a 
program and the development of affordable housing.”). 
164 See supra notes 132–45, 159–61 and accompanying text. 
165 See supra notes 146–58 and accompanying text. 
166 Byrne & Diamond, supra note 13, at 531. 
167 HPD, TASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 1. 
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1. Citizens Housing and Planning Council of New York 
One such organization was the Citizens Housing and Planning 
Council of New York (“CHPC”). For several years, CHPC168 had 
called for a variety of substantive changes to the 421-a program and 
to zoning laws in general in order to spur affordable housing 
creation.169 CHPC contended that requiring, at minimum, 20% of 
on-site apartments in the exclusion zone be affordable created an 
inflexible system that failed to persuade developers to provide 
anything more than 20% because developers stood to gain no extra 
benefit.170 Moreover, CHPC argued that a freeze on eligibility 
requirements for on-site exclusion zone affordable apartments at 
“no more than 80%” AMI prevented developers from “tap[ping] 
the huge market [of] households earning above 80% [AMI] but 
below what is necessary to rent new market-rate apartments.”171 
Instead, CHPC recommended creating a more adaptable program 
by instituting a “sliding scale of set-aside percentages and tenant 
[income] eligibility limits.”172 In effect, this change would 
encourage developers to build more affordable housing units 
                                                           
168 Citizens Housing and Planning Council “is a non-profit policy research 
organization dedicated to improving housing and neighborhood conditions 
through cooperative efforts of the public and private sectors.” Citizens Housing 
and Planning Council, http://www.chpcny.org/ (last visited, Apr. 14, 2008). 
169 The Inclusionary Housing Program “combines a zoning floor area bonus 
with a variety of housing subsidy programs to create powerful incentives for the 
development and preservation of affordable housing. Developers [must] devote at 
least 20 percent of their residential floor area to [permanently affordable] housing” 
to maximize the incentives under the program. Int. 487, Dec. 11, 2006. 
http://webdocs.nyccouncil.info/attachments/75428.htm (last visited Apr. 14. 
2008) (citing NEW YORK CITY DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, NEW YORK CITY 
ZONING: INCLUSIONARY HOUSING PROGRAM, available at http://home.nyc. 
gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zh_inclu_housing.shtml). 
170 CHPC, ENHANCE, supra note 43, at 8. 
171 Id. While there is no specific data to show exactly how many families 
fall into this range, data shows that approximately 820,000 City families fall 
into the census income bands between $50,000 and $99,000. US Census 
Bureau, American Factfinder 2006 for New York City, http://factfinder. 
census.gov (type “New York City” in City/Town/Zip box, follow the “show 
more” hyperlink next to Economic Characteristics) (last visited Apr. 14, 2008). 
172 CHPC, ENHANCE, supra note 43, at 8. 
  
 TEACHING AN OLD POLICY NEW TRICKS 787 
because it would reward developers with more tax incentives if 
they chose to build over the statutory floor of 20%.173 
2. Housing Here and Now 
In a similarly progressive vein, Housing Here and Now 
(“HHN”)174 called for the exclusion zone to be expanded to 
encompass the entire City, thus revoking any as-of-right tax 
incentives for developers and instead obligating developers to 
provide on-site affordable low- and moderate-income housing if 
they wanted tax incentives.175 Moreover, the coalition called for “at 
least 30% of the units [to] be affordable for families earning up to 
50% of area median income.”176 Under this proposal, not only 
would more affordable units be created, but more of those units 
would effectively go to families who earned less money.177 
Furthermore, HHN urged that any developers who declined to 
build any affordable housing would have their taxes directed to the 
                                                           
173 Id. For example, the CHPC-proposed scale would allow developers 
electing to create 40% of their units as affordable units would be permitted to 
increase the maximum average household income of renters up from 100% to 
120%. As a result, while more affordable units would be created, developers 
could recoup the cost by renting other units to those with higher incomes. Id. 
174 Housing Here and Now is a “coalition of affordable housing groups, 
labor unions, AIDS activists, churches and community groups [who] have 
joined together to demand that our leaders guarantee housing for ALL New 
Yorkers.” Housing Here and Now, http://www.housinghereandnow.org (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2008). 
175 HOUSING HERE AND NOW, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM OF THE 
421-A PROGRAM (2006), available at http://www.housinghereandnow.org/ 
policy_421a.html (click on link below “421-a Housing Here and Now 
Recommendations (July 26, 2006)”). 
176 Id. 
177 This is because more units would be available for those families earning 
less than $35,450. See id. HHN also advocated for incentives for developers who 
dedicated 100% of their units to affordable housing for families earning moderate-
income. Id. A “moderate-income” family is generally defined as one that earns 
between 80% and 120% AMI, which currently equates to between $56,720 and 
$85,080. See COMMUNITY PLANNING BD. 12, AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
DEFINED, AFFORDABLE RENT CALCULATIONS (2006), available at http://cd12-
plan.net/Documents/AffordableHousingDefined.pdf. 
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City’s Affordable Housing Fund, and that developers would be 
required to pay building service workers prevailing wages if they 
received tax incentives under the program.178 
3. Pratt Center For Community Development and Habitat       
For Humanity 
Other organizations that became involved in the advisory 
process for the revamping of 421-a included the Pratt Center for 
Community Development179 and Habitat For Humanity New York 
City (referred to jointly as “Pratt”), which partnered together to 
provide a recommendation report.180 While the two groups did not 
initially suggest their own proposed reforms, they nevertheless 
mapped out the overarching issues that the Mayor’s task force 
should consider.181 Pratt predicted that the Task Force would take 
on important questions like whether to set a maximum cap on 
benefits that developers could receive for any project, and whether 
it would be more effective to expand the exclusion zone or do away 
with it altogether by requiring all new building projects in the City 
to set aside a certain number of affordable units.182 Further, Pratt 
                                                           
178 Id. The Affordable Housing Fund, see infra notes 201–15 and 
accompanying text, is a fund solely dedicated to financing the construction of 
affordable housing stock. Prevailing wages, see infra notes 256–63 and 
accompanying text, refers to the wages that maintenance workers in 421-a 
buildings receive. The 421-a program as envisioned by CHPC, would not only 
ensure that developers opting out of the 421-a program were indirectly 
promoting affordable housing through their City property taxes, but also that 
families earning moderate income were not also priced out of the City. 
Additionally, CHPC’s proposal sought to spread the benefits of the 421-a 
program to those actually working in 421-a subsidized buildings. Id. 
179 Pratt Center for Community Development “works for a more just, 
equitable, and sustainable city for all New Yorkers, by empowering 
communities to plan for and realize their futures.” Pratt Center for Community 
Development, About Pratt Center, http://www.prattcenter.net/about.php (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2008). PCCD partnered with Habitat For Humanity on this 
recommendation paper. 
180 PRATT, SUBSIDIZE, supra note 39. 
181 PRATT, SUBSIDIZE, supra note 39, at 9–10. 
182 Id. Indeed, the Task Force duly took up these questions, determining 
that the exclusion zone should be expanded, not removed completely, and that 
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focused on whether the off-site negotiable certificates program 
should be abolished, or if it would be better to keep and enhance 
the existing program by setting higher minimum prices for 
certificates and creating more oversight for these private 
transactions.183 
4. Mayor Bloomberg’s 421-a Task Force 
Reflected in the ultimate recommendations of Mayor 
Bloomberg’s 421-a Task Force were aspects of the Pratt, CHPC 
and HHN proposals outlined above.184 The Task Force determined 
that the best route was to institute several substantive changes to 
jumpstart the affordable housing prong of the program.185 The 
most significant of these recommendations included: 1) expanding 
the exclusion zone to include specific areas in Brooklyn and 
Queens that were exhibiting rapidly growing populations and 
increasingly affluent socio-economic areas;186 2) limiting 421-a 
eligibility only to projects with at least six units;187 3) eliminating 
the negotiable certificate program and replacing it with a dedicated 
affordable housing fund;188 and 4) capping the “total amount of tax 
benefits that any market rate unit” could receive in a development 
that did not contain on-site affordable housing (i.e., developments 
inside of the exclusion zone).189 
                                                           
there should be a maximum level for tax benefits a developer could receive. See 
infra notes 184–89 and accompanying text. 
183 Id. 
184 See infra notes 168–83 and accompanying text. 
185 See HPD, TASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 2–3. 
186 GEA Map, supra note 79. 
187 HPD, TASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 2–3, 4, 6–8. Limiting tax 
incentives to buildings with more than 6 units effectively prevents developers 
from building small-scale developments and receiving 421-a tax benefits; this 
decision, however, all but forecloses the possibility for small developers to take 
advantage of the 421-a program. 
188 Id. The Affordable Housing Fund is a fund solely dedicated to financing 
the construction of affordable housing stock. See infra notes 201–15 and 
accompanying text. 
189 Id. In turn, developers in the exclusion zone could not obtain large 
numbers of negotiable certificates unlike previous developers such as Donald 
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B. City Council Compromises 
Bloomberg’s recommendations were formally introduced to the 
City Council in early December 2006.190 However forward-looking 
the proposed reforms may have been, some City Council members 
nevertheless viewed them with criticism as not being sufficiently 
progressive.191 Eventually, three other competing proposals 
emerged as options for determining new contours for the program. 
The first competing proposal was offered by City Council 
Speaker Christine Quinn, which similarly called for eliminating the 
negotiable certificate program and excluded three-unit projects from 
obtaining exemptions.192 Her proposal went further than 
Bloomberg’s, however, by allowing four- and five-unit projects to 
remain qualified for exemption, calling for a comparatively 
expanded exclusion zone and establishing a committee to regularly 
review the exclusion zone boundaries.193 Moreover, only those 
developers who devoted at least 20% on-site affordable housing to 
families earning no more than 80% AMI would be granted tax 
incentives.194 
The second competing proposal was offered by Council 
Members Annabel Palma and David Yassky, which advocated for 
substantially simplifying the program by eliminating the exclusion 
zone and significantly ramping up benefits to families earning low-
income wages.195 Council Members Alan Gerson and Letitia James 
                                                           
Trump who faced fewer obstacles before the task force’s recommendations were 
implemented. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
190 Int. 472 (2006), available at http://webdocs.nyccouncil.info/ 
attachments/75424.htm. 
191 Janny Scott, Challenging a Tax Break for Housing Developers, N.Y 
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2006, at B3 [hereinafter Scott, Challenging]. 
192 Int. 486-A (2006), available at http://webdocs.nyccouncil.info/ 
attachments/75471.htm. 
193 Id. 
194 No more than 5% of these affordable units had to be available to families 
earning between 60% to 80% AMI as calculated from the previous calendar year. 
Id. 
195 Id. Specifically, Palma and Yassky contended that both Bloomberg’s 
and Quinn’s proposals only “[slightly] narrow[ed] the tax break” and that “pure 
market rate development should be completely eliminat[ed]”. Scott, 
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offered a final competing proposal.196 Most significantly, their bill 
would have required developers to set aside 35% of on-site 
affordable housing in a development at 60% AMI in order to 
qualify for 421-a benefits.197 
One of the major opponents to any changes in the 421-a 
program was, unsurprisingly, the President of the Real Estate 
Board of New York, Steven Spinola.198 Spinola asserted that any 
new bill would “ ‘result in less production of housing, as well as 
less production of affordable housing’ [and] that the changes would 
alter the economics of development in certain neighborhoods, 
limiting the incentive for developers to proceed with their projects 
there.”199 Spinola and others urged reform of the negotiable 
certificate program instead of abandoning it altogether.200 
                                                           
Challenging, supra note 191. Palma’s proposal would “get rid of this loophole 
altogether” by completely eliminating the exclusion zone, thus compelling all 
developers within the City to build on-site affordable units. Id. The 
Palma/Yassky bill would not only have allowed projects with at least three 
units to qualify for incentives, but also would have compelled developers 
seeking 421-a tax incentives anywhere in the City to reserve at least 30% on-site 
units as affordable. Int. 490 (2006), available at http://webdocs.nyccouncil. 
info/attachments/75430.htm. This three-unit proposition would have allowed 
smaller developers to take advantage of the 421-a tax incentives. Moreover, these 
units could only be made available to families earning no more than 50% AMI 
($35,450 for a family of four). Id. Lowering the eligibility level to 50% AMI 
would arguably have realigned the program to benefit those families who were 
most disadvantaged. Indeed, as compared to the previous proposals, the 
Palma/Yassky recommendations were arguably more akin to the most 
progressive proposals of the affordable housing advocates. See supra notes 133–
36, 139–40 and accompanying text. 
196 Int. 487 (2006), available at http://webdocs.nyccouncil.info/ 
attachments/75428.htm. 
197 Id. Like the Palma/Yassky proposal, the Gerson/James proposal would 
have significantly raised the conditions for developers to meet before they could 
obtain tax benefits under the program by increasing the required amount of on-
site affordable housing and lowering the income threshold. 
198 See Janny Scott, In Overhaul, City Seeks to Expand Lower Cost Units, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2006, at A1 [hereinafter Scott, Overhaul]. 
199 Id. 
200 Matthew Schuerman, Mayor Faces Pitched Battle Over Breaks for 
Developers, N.Y. OBSERVER, Sept. 24, 2006, http://www.observer.com/node/ 
52713. REBNY only took a lobbying role in negotiations over the City 
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C. City Council Legislation—Local Law 58 
Ultimately, the City Council overwhelmingly approved the 
bulk of Quinn’s proposal in Local Law 58 in December 2006.201 
The Law included an expanded exclusion zone, mandated on-site 
affordable housing units, and elimination of certain “of right” tax 
incentives. First, the exclusion zone was expanded into certain 
gentrifying areas in Brooklyn and Queens,202 and a boundary 
review commission was created in order to assess the zone map 
every other year.203 Moreover, within the zone, at least 20% of 
units were mandated to be “on site” affordable units; i.e., “situated 
within the building or buildings for which benefits . . . are being 
granted.”204 As before, such units were eligible only for families 
earning no more than 80% AMI.205 Outside of the exclusion zone, 
25-year as-of-right tax incentives were eliminated unless the 
projects provided on-site affordable units or were built under 
certain other government affordable housing programs.206 
In addition to the on-site mandate and the elimination of the 25-
year as-of-right exemptions, several other elements of the 421-a 
program were altered. Most importantly, certain projects were 
precluded from receiving tax benefits, an Affordable Housing Fund 
was established, and market-rate rentals had tax benefit caps.207 
Specifically, the City Council determined that only buildings with 
four or more units would receive tax incentives, thus precluding 
two- or three-unit projects from getting such benefits and ensuring 
that developments benefiting from the tax incentives would 
                                                           
Council bill. 
201 Scott, Overhaul, supra note 198. The measure for Local Law 58 passed 
by a vote of 44 to 5. Mayor Bloomberg endorsed Quinn’s proposal as well. Id. 
202 NEW YORK CITY, CODE §§ 11-245(a)(2–4) (2007). 
203 NEW YORK CITY, CODE §§ 11-245.1(a–d) (2007). 
204 NEW YORK CITY, CODE § 11-245(b-1) (2007). 
205 NEW YORK CITY, CODE § 11-245(b-2) (2007). 
206 DEP’T OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV., 421-A LEGISLATION OVERVIEW AND 
FAQ 1 (2007), available at http://home.nyc.gov/html/hpd/downloads/pdf/421a-
FAQ.pdf [hereinafter HPD, FAQ]. 
207 See NEW YORK CITY, CODE §§ 11-245(b); 11-245.1-a (2007); NEW 
YORK CITY, CHARTER § 1805 (2007). 
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advantage more low-income families.208  
The Affordable Housing Fund that Mayor Bloomberg had 
proposed209 in effect replaced the negotiable certificate system, 
creating a different alternate means for financing affordable housing 
development. The major goals of the Fund is to 1) direct affordable 
housing funds to specific neighborhoods with the highest 
percentage of “poor” households; 2) finance projects that would 
create affordable housing; and 3) finance projects where developers 
agree to preserve levels of affordability past the duration of tax 
abatement.210 Additionally, in order to combat the deep 
subsidization of luxury developments, the local law set a ceiling on 
the maximum tax incentives that any market-rate unit could receive 
at $65,000 per unit.211 
Upon passing Local Law 58, Speaker Quinn pledged that “[t]he 
bill will create even more affordable housing, encourage 
development in communities where it is still needed and protect 
taxpayer dollars from over-subsidizing new luxury 
development.”212 Even those who had introduced competing bills 
voted for Quinn’s plan.213 Councilmember Palma recognized its 
significance, musing, “We need to look at this piece of legislation[] 
and look at the significant improvements [from the previous 
program].”214 Yassky similarly observed that the law “[would] 
result in more affordable housing and [would] eliminat[e] some of 
the most egregious disparities in the property tax.”215 
                                                           
208 NEW YORK CITY, CODE § 11-245.1-b(c) (2007). 
209 NEW YORK CITY, CHARTER § 1805 (2007). 
210 NEW YORK CITY, CHARTER § 1805(4)(a–c) (2007). 
211 HPD, FAQ, supra note 206, at 2. Indeed, prior versions of the 421-a 
program allowed for unlimited tax incentives, which allowed for high-end luxury 
developers to cash in. The exemption cap will certainly help to curb this 
phenomenon. See supra notes 138–42 and accompanying text. 
212 Scott, Overhaul, supra note 198. 
213 Id. 
214 Josh Burd & Gail Robinson, Tax Breaks For Affordable Housing, 
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D. The New 421-a Program: 2007–2010 
The 421-a program amendments by the City Council had to 
clear one more hurdle to become law.216 In New York state, a local 
law related to a “state concern” such as housing may not be 
unilaterally adopted unless “authorized specifically [by the State 
Legislature] . . . or unless the State Legislature has specifically 
granted such power to the City.”217 Thus, while the State 
Legislature had the authority to simply rubber stamp Local Law 
58, it also had the ability to modify it prior to enactment.218 The 
task of shepherding the bill through the State Legislature and 
reauthorizing the tax incentives fell primarily to the Chairman of 
the Housing and Buildings Committee and representative for the 
53rd Assembly District in Brooklyn,219 Assemblyman Vito 
Lopez.220 
                                                           
216 DOS, REVISING, supra note 38, at 3. 
217 Id. 
218 See id. 
219 The 53rd Assembly District encompasses sections of Williamsburg and 
Bushwick and is currently a lesson in socio-economic contradictions. The NYU 
Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy describes Williamsburg’s 
housing market as having “consistently high numbers of new certificates of 
occupancy . . . . [P]rices continue to rise rapidly and the district now has the 3rd 
highest rate of price appreciation in the City for 2–4 unit buildings.” FURMAN, 
HOUSING, supra note 8, at 58. Breaking with trends, Williamsburg “has seen 
rates of subprime refinance lending decline steadily in recent years [and] median 
household incomes increased significantly in the district since 2002.” FURMAN, 
HOUSING, supra note 8, at 58. In contrast, Bushwick’s housing market is 
described as “exhibit[ing] somewhat divergent trends. On the one hand, the 
neighborhood has benefited from high rates of price appreciation . . . . [but] 
almost half of all new home purchase and refinance loans . . . are subprime, and 
Bushwick suffers from consistently high rates of foreclosure. Bushwick also has 
the highest rate of serious housing code violations in the City . . . .” Id. at 61. 
220 As an Assemblyman for the State Legislature, Lopez was not involved 
in the process at the City Council level. See Matthew Schuerman, Grinding 
Sausage Late at Night: Albany Reforms 421a Program, N.Y. OBSERVER, June 
26, 2007, available at http://www.observer.com/2007/grinding-sausage-late-
night-albany-reforms-421a-program (“[T]he program, scheduled to expire at the 
end of this year, needed state reauthorization before the City Council’s changes 
took effect. That’s where Mr. Lopez came in.”). 
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1. Opening Moves in the State Legislature 
Initially, it appeared that Lopez was poised to tighten the 
program’s requirements even more by restricting income eligibility 
levels to 60% AMI (down from the City Council’s 80% AMI 
level), mandating that at least 30% of on-site units be affordable 
(up from 20%),221 and expanding the exclusion zone across the 
entire City.222 Indeed, these modifications would not only have 
shifted the demographic the program was aiming to serve, but also 
would have made developers create more affordable housing in 
order to receive the tax incentives.223 
Lopez also questioned the method of pegging 421-a 
affordability levels to the regional AMI calculation.224 While the 
HUD-defined AMI for the entire City is currently $70,900, the 
true AMI in Queens is closer to $49,000, and the AMI in 
Brooklyn is only $37,000.225 As Lopez succinctly observed, 
“AMI in Bushwick is [only] $22,000. Regional AMI is a joke.” To 
Lopez, the “need [for moderate-income housing was] great but it 
shouldn’t be at the expense of people in Bushwick or 
Williamsburg.”226 
In response to Lopez’s lofty ambitions of further restricting 
the program, pro-development critics, including the Real Estate 
Board of New York, argued that including middle-income families 
                                                           
221 See Atlantic Yards Report, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com (June 
20, 2007, 6:29 EST). 
222 Shane Miller, City Reformed It, But State Must Approve It, QUEENS 
LEDGER, Mar 22, 2007, available at http://www.queensledger.com/ 
StoryDisplay.asp?PID=1&NewsStoryID=5470 (“Lopez, as well as affordable 
housing advocates, have been critical of the city’s proposal, arguing that the city 
shouldn’t subsidize market-rate housing, and that the entire city should be an 
exclusion zone.”). 
223 See supra note 195 and accompanying text regarding Int. 490. 
224 Atlantic Yards Report, supra note 221. “The big dilemma we have, 
with federal government getting out of public housing and Section 8 [housing 
vouchers], it puts a real burden on the underclass, people who earn $15,000, 
$18,000 a year. Affordable—it’s a relative thing” because AMI is calculated on a 
region-wide level. Id. 
225 Id. 
226 Atlantic Yards Report, supra note 221. 
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in the affordable housing calculation was necessary, and that any 
further restrictions beyond Local Law 58’s program modifications 
would stifle all development in the City.227 In light of Lopez’s 
proposed changes, even the Real Estate Board of New York turned 
to back the City Council bill, as did parties from the other side—
including some affordable housing advocates who feared that 
Lopez’s proposals would encumber smaller developers too 
much.228 
2. The Outcome of Negotiations–A Revised 421-a Program 
In the end, the New York State Legislature endorsed many 
sections of Local Law 58, including eliminating the negotiable 
certificate program and 25-year as-of-right benefits, creating the 
Affordable Housing Fund, and capping the maximum amount of 
incentives a project was eligible to receive.229 Notwithstanding the 
strong indications from Lopez that the Legislature wanted 
significantly stronger 421-a reforms, what eventually emerged was 
legislation that melded the City Council’s law with parts of 
Lopez’s vision, a compromise to ensure passage of the bills.230 
                                                           
227 As the Commissioner for the City’s Department of Housing 
Preservation and Development asserted, “We agree we need low-income 
housing, but we need more middle-income housing. . . .” Id. Critics who 
claimed that revisions to 421-a would stifle development essentially used the 
same threat that they had in 1985—that any additional limitations on 
development in the City would scare off any further development. See supra, 
note 96 and accompanying text. 
228 See id. 
229 See generally, N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a (McKinney 2007). 
230 Three Assembly Bills (A.) and one Senate Bill (S.) form the framework 
for the changes to the program: A. 4408; A. 9293; A. 9305; and S. 6446. See 
A. 4408-A, 2007 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2007); A. 9293, 2007 Leg., 230th 
Sess. (N.Y. 2007); A. 9305, 2007 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2007); S. 6446, 
2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008). 
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a. Exclusion Zone Expansion 
Although the Legislature declined to adopt a City-wide 
expansion of the exclusion zone, it did greatly extend the zone to 
more neighborhoods than were proposed by the City Council, 
more than doubling the areas in the City where the 421-a laws 
affirmatively apply.231 In these areas, developers are now obligated 
to create at least 20% on-site affordable housing if they wish to 
build there and can no longer opt for negotiable certificates 
instead.232 Outside of the zone, however, there is still no mandate 
to create affordable units, and market-rate units rent level is still 
determined by the prevailing rates in the area.233 As explained by 
Lopez, 
What we’ve done is expanded those 421-a zones to fifteen 
more communities, eight more than the City Council 
excluded. [Many] people strongly objected to the [broader] 
City-wide [proposal] because they didn’t want to use the 
concept of tax benefits as a way of mandating affordability. 
[In turn, the zone, once only in Manhattan, was expanded 
such that now] every borough has a program. [Community 
                                                           
231 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW §§ 421-a(7)(a)(ii); 421-a(11) (McKinney 
2007); A. 4408-A §§ 11(A-B), 2007 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2007). See also 
Rachel Nielsen, Developers Incentives: Now With More Caveats, CITY LIMITS, 
Aug. 27, 2007, available at http://www.citylimits.org/content/articles/ 
viewarticle.cfm?article_id=3395. In addition to the original Manhattan and 
Greenpoint-Williamsburg zones, the new exclusion zone areas include: all of 
Manhattan; portions of Claremont and Crotona Park in the Bronx; Downtown 
Brooklyn as well as parts of Red Hook, Sunset Park, East Williamsburg, 
Bushwick, East New York, Crown Heights, Weeksville, Highland Park, Ocean 
Hill, Prospect Heights, Carroll Gardens, Cobble Hill, Boerum Hill, and Park 
Slope; sections of Long Island City, Astoria, Woodside, Jackson Heights, and 
the East River Waterfront in Queens; and, sections of St. George, Stapleton, 
New Brighton, and Port Richmond in Staten Island. HPD, FAQ, supra note 
206, at 1. See GEA Map, supra note 79. 
232 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(7)(f) (McKinney 2007). 
233 See NEW YORK CITY LOCAL LAW No. 58 §§ 1-2 (2006); N.Y. REAL 
PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(11) (McKinney 2007), which legislate the exclusion 
zones. Outside of these areas, though, there is no mandated affordability 
restriction. 
  
798 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Boards] picked areas that were prime for gentrification [in 
order] to slow it down [and to] be inclusive of working 
class people.234 
b. New Income Eligibility Restrictions 
In line with the City Council’s law and Lopez’s goals, the 
eligibility level for the 20% on-site affordable housing units built 
within the expanded exclusion zone was modified; now, income 
levels are dependent on whether other government subsidies are 
involved in the project.235 Developers within the zone seeking 421-
a benefits who build a project without any government assistance 
are obligated to reserve at least 20% of their units as affordable for 
families earning 60% AMI. However if those developers build a 
project with at least twenty-five units and receive “substantial 
assistance of grants, loans or subsidies from any federal, state or 
local agency,” they are allowed to raise the income eligibility level 
of the affordable units to an average of 90% AMI.236 Developers 
with substantial government assistance who build a project with 
less than twenty-five units can set income eligibility for the 20% 
affordable units at no more than 120% AMI.237 
Under the non-government assistance option, the target 
demographic has shifted downward, thereby allowing more families 
earning lower incomes to qualify for affordable units under the 
program.238 Whereas under prior versions of the law, only families 
                                                           
234 Interview with Vito Lopez, Assemblyman for the 53rd Assembly 
District, in Brooklyn, N.Y. (Oct. 25, 2007). 
235 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(7)(c) (McKinney 2007), amended 
by S. 6446 § 1, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008). 
236 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(7)(c) (McKinney 2007), amended 
by S. 6446 § 1, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008). 
237 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(7)(c) (McKinney 2007), amended 
by S. 6446 § 1, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008). 
238 Compare N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(7)(c)(i) (McKinney 
2007) (“[Rent in affordable units must be affordable to] families whose incomes 
at the time of initial occupancy do not exceed sixty percent [AMI] . . . .”), with 
N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW §§ 421-a(2)(a)(ii)(C), 421-a(2)(a)(iii)(D), 421-
a(2)(a)(iv)(A) (McKinney 2005) (“[Rent in affordable units must] be affordable to 
families of low . . . income [as set by the local housing agency].”). 
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making up to $56,700 would qualify for an on-site affordable 
housing unit in a new building within the exclusion zone, that same 
family would no longer be eligible—income is currently capped at 
$42,540 for non-government assisted developments.239 
The government assistance option, though, effectively increases 
the average income eligibility level with respect to the affordable 
units, from $56,700 (80% AMI) to an average of $63,810 (90% 
AMI).240 This provision permits developers increased flexibility to 
determine income eligibility levels for affordable units.241 For 
instance, a developer of an 80-unit project within the exclusion 
zone that finances a project with substantial government assistance 
could obtain 421-a tax benefits by setting aside ten units for 
families earning $42,540 (60% AMI) and ten units for families 
earning $85,080 (120% AMI). As a result, families earning less are 
more likely to be shut out of affordable apartments under this 
option simply because developers are permitted to seek renters 
with higher incomes.242 
                                                           
239 See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(7)(c)(ii)(A) (McKinney 2007), 
amended by S. 6446 § 1, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008). 
240 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(7)(c)(ii)(A) (McKinney 2007), 
amended by S. 6446 § 1, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008). 
241 Compare N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(7)(c)(i) (McKinney 
2007), amended by S. 6446 § 1, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008) 
(“[T]wenty percent of the units [must be affordable to] families whose 
incomes . . . do not exceed [60% AMI].”), with N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 
421-a(7)(c)(ii)(A) (McKinney 2007), amended by S. 6446 § 1, 2008 Leg., 230th 
Sess. (N.Y. 2008) (“[If construction] is carried out with substantial assistance of 
grants, loans or subsidies from any federal, state or local agency . . . twenty 
percent of the units [must be affordable to] families whose incomes . . . do not 
exceed [120% AMI] and, where the multiple dwelling contains more than 
twenty-five units, do not exceed an average of [90% AMI] . . . .”). 
242 Id. Regrettably, a developer building with government assistance can 
entirely circumvent families earning incomes in the lower ranges and still meet 
the requirement to obtain tax benefits. For example, a developer building a 20-
unit project could set aside four units at $85,080 (120% AMI) and satisfy the 
provision. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(7)(c)(i) (McKinney 2007), 
amended by S. 6446 § 1, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008). Similarly, a 
developer building a 100-unit project could meet the provision simply by 
setting aside twenty units at $63,810, which equates to an average of 90% AMI. 
N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(7)(c)(ii)(A) (McKinney 2007), amended by 
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Contrary to initial indications, the HUD-defined AMI was 
wholly preserved in the new version of the 421-a program.243 It 
was argued that the State Legislature lacked authority to narrow the 
scope to the desired neighborhood or even City level because the 
regional AMI calculations are a “federal standard that’s used across 
the country [and the] federal government picks those areas 
and . . . applies them.”244 Without the apparent authority to 
restructure AMI itself, proponents of setting the level at 60% 
AMI asserted that the move would effectively create the same 
outcome by expanding affordable housing to families earning 
incomes lower than prior versions of the program.245 As a result, 
the AMI level was effectively modified in an attempt to achieve 
the same outcome as shifting to a more localized AMI 
calculation—targeting families earning incomes at the lowest levels. 
That said, the substantial government assistance option only seems 
to partially target such families because developers can spread 
income levels for affordable units across a wider, and wealthier, 
spectrum.246 
c. Extended Rent Stabilization Period 
The new 421-a amendments also stabilize the rents for 
affordable units for thirty-five years247 even though the tax 
incentives for developers expire at least ten years before that 
time.248 This provision significantly lengthens the period of rent 
                                                           
S. 6446 § 1, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008). 
243 See generally, N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a (McKinney 2007) 
(“area median income” cited throughout). 
244 Public Hearing, supra note 49, at 54–55 (statement of Shaun 
Donnovan, HPD Commissioner). 
245 Public Hearing, supra note 49, at 59 (statement of Hakeem Jeffries, 
Assemblyman for the 57th Assembly District). 
246 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW §421-a(7)(c)(ii)(A) (McKinney 2007), 
amended by S. 6446 § 1, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008). This provision 
allows for affordable units to be, on average, 90% AMI for buildings with 25 
units or more. Id. 
247 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(7)(b) (McKinney 2007), as 
amended by S. 6446 § 2, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008). 
248 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW §§ 421-a(2)(a)(ii), 421-a(2)(a)(iv) 
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stabilization; in the past, rent stabilization simply ended when the 
tax incentive period ended.249 “Prior to this,” Lopez observed, 
“only the Mitchell-Lama [affordable housing] program had a longer 
[rent stabilization] period of twenty-five years.”250 As a result, 
developers receiving 421-a tax benefits may not increase the rent 
for almost double the amount of time that they could before.251 
This will create additional wealth for families earning low-income 
wages in the form of reduced rent burdens over time.252 
d. Community Preference Provision 
Also included in the finalized amendments is a provision 
demonstrating strong preference for those currently living in 
neighborhoods with new 421-a construction to have preferential 
treatment for housing instead of simply being priced out of the 
area.253 Now, within the expanded exclusion zone, “residents of the 
local community shall have priority for the purchase or rental of 
fifty percent of the affordable units.”254 As Lopez has explained, 
“if you build 100 units in Bushwick, twenty of the units [must be 
designated] affordable. Half [of those, or ten units] must come from 
community. You sort of become a stakeholder if you live in the 
community,”255 and this provision works to retain some of those 
stakeholders in the neighborhood by ensuring some units are set 
aside for pre-existing community members. 
                                                           
(McKinney 2007). 
249 See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(2)(f) (McKinney 2005). 
250 Interview with Vito Lopez, supra note 234. 
251 Compare N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(2)(f) (McKinney 2005), 
with N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(7)(b) (McKinney 2007), as amended 
by S. 6446 § 2, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008). 
252 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
253 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW §§ 421-a(2)(a)(ii), 421-a(2)(a)(iv)  
(McKinney 2007). 
254 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(6)(d) (McKinney 2007). It is 
important to note that there is no oversight mechanism created by the new 
legislation. It is unclear how exactly the City will monitor and enforce this 
community preference ideal. 
255 Interview with Vito Lopez, supra note 234. 
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e. Prevailing Wage Preservation 
An important and novel addition to the 421-a program was in 
the area of wages for building service employees working in 
buildings receiving 421-a tax incentives.256 Aside from of the 
program’s focus on affordable housing, an associated concern was 
that “while 80[%] of building service workers across the City earn 
a prevailing wage, only 50[%] of such workers at buildings 
receiving 421-a benefits do.”257 As City Comptroller William 
Thompson described this divergence, “I think it is wrong for 
taxpayers to assist projects like these where workers earn wages 
that are barely livable.”258 
Section 8(b) of the new 421-a provides that in buildings with 
fifty or more units, “all building service employees employed at 
the building . . . shall receive the applicable prevailing wage for the 
duration of the building’s tax exemption.”259 Under this provision, 
all “building service employees” working in 421-a buildings must 
be paid the prevailing wage for that specific type of work.260 As a 
previous study determined, a “prevailing wage requirement [will] 
boost the annual wages with benefits included for a building service 
                                                           
256 See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(8)(b) (McKinney 2007). 
257 NEW YORK CITY COMPTROLLER’S OFFICE, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE 
NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY COMMITTEES ON REAL PROPERTY TAXATION 
AND HOUSING REGARDING THE RPTL SECTION 421-A INCENTIVE PROGRAM 3 
(2006), available at http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/press/testimonies/Jun08-
06-Testimony_Before_The_NewYorkState_Assembly421a.pdf. 
258 Id. 
259 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(8)(b) (McKinney 2007). The 
prevailing wage provisions do not apply in buildings with less than 50 units, or 
in buildings where at initial occupancy at least 50% of the units are deemed 
affordable to families earning less than 125% AMI ($88,625). N.Y. REAL PROP. 
TAX LAW § 421-a(8)(c) (McKinney 2007). 
260 “Building service employees” are defined broadly as “any person who is 
regularly employed at a building who performs work in connection with the care 
or maintenance of such building.” N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(8)(a)(i) 
(McKinney 2007). This may include “watchman, guard, doorman, building 
cleaner, porter, handyman, janitor, gardener, groundskeeper, elevator operator 
and starter, and window cleaner.” § 421-a(8)(a)(i). “Prevailing wages” refers to 
the going in-state wage rate for building service employees working in different 
capacities. See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(8)(a)(ii) (McKinney 2007). 
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worker from approximately $36,500 to over $47,400 [in order to] 
cover basic [family] needs such as food, housing and child care.”261 
As Lopez explained, “We [have] created a precedent for 
prevailing wages. We fought for fifty units; the City wanted 100 
units.” Notably, the City’s 100-unit proposal, “would have [only] 
created 350 prevailing wage jobs . . . . [S]ince most of the [421-a] 
buildings [range from] 60–80 units, they all would have been 
exempt [from the] prevailing wage provision.”262 Instead, “[at the 
fifty unit level,] we will create 1,500 prevailing wage jobs . . . .”263 
f. Disparate Treatment for One Developer 
Shortly before the amendments were ready to be voted upon, 
one extra provision was added to the new state legislation.264 The 
provision initially stated in part that:  
[A] project that includes at least twenty-five hundred 
dwelling units . . . shall be eligible for benefits . . . 
notwithstanding paragraph (f) of subdivision seven of this 
section if in the aggregate twenty percent of the units . . . 
are affordable to . . . families [whose average] incomes do 
not exceed . . . seventy percent of the area median 
incomes.”265  
 
In effect, this section operated to create a significant loophole 
around the on-site and income eligibility provisions placed on 
exclusion zone developments elsewhere in the bill.266 
                                                           
261 Marnie McGregor, Testimony Before the NYC Council Housing and 
Building Committee On Prevailing Wage Legislation, Apr. 22, 2005, available 
at http://www.prattcenter.net/test-prevailwage.php. 
262 Interview with Vito Lopez, supra note 234. 
263 Id. 
264 Ariella Cohen, Earlier report: Assemblyman gives Ratner a clause for 
celebration, BROOKLYN PAPER, June 30, 2007, available at http://www. 
brooklynpaper.com/stories/30/26/30_26bruceboost.html [hereinafter Cohen, 
Earlier]. 
265 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(13) (McKinney 2007) (emphasis 
added). 
266 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(2)(f) (McKinney 2007); N.Y. 
REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(7)(c)(1) (McKinney 2007). 
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Instead of on-site affordable housing, this section only required 
affordable housing “in the aggregate” over the project.267 By 
contrast to other developments that did not fit under this extra 
provision, the addition of these three words allowed a project 
falling under this provision to obtain tax incentives for the entire 
project, even if affordable units were only in some of the project’s 
buildings.268 This creates the potential for a sprawling, largely 
market-rate unit project, with a segregated section for affordable 
units, ultimately benefiting those with higher incomes (as well as 
the developer).269 
Further complicating matters, income eligibility levels for a 
project under this provision were loosened to 70% AMI, up from 
60% AMI for all other similarly situated developments.270 In turn, 
rents could be 10% higher in an applicable development than in 
other 421-a developments.271 As a result, the tax exemptions could 
have been worth as much as $300 million in real estate tax 
exemptions and increased rent to a developer whose project fit the 
provision.272 
Interestingly, special interests appear to be involved in this 
dramatic new change to the 421-a amendments. Given the specific 
wording of the above section, this special exemption only applies 
to one large, high-profile development project already considered 
controversial by some due to its comparative size,273 public cost,274 
                                                           
267 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(13) (McKinney 2007). 
268 Id. 
269 Id. This provision would also logically lead to socio-economic 
segregation within the project as well. See id. 
270 Compare N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(7)(c) (McKinney 2007), 
with N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(13) (McKinney 2007). 
271 Compare N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(7)(c) (McKinney 2007), 
with N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(13) (McKinney 2007). 
272 Ariella Cohen, Bloomy slams “Ratner carve-out,” BROOKLYN PAPER, 
June 29, 2007, available at http://www.brooklynpaper.com/stories/30/26/30_ 
26ratnerbloomy.html [hereinafter Cohen, Bloomy]. 
273 When completed, Atlantic Yards will be comprised of a “basketball 
arena and 16 towers containing 6,860 apartments on 22 acres in Prospect 
Heights . . . .” David Lombino, Pressure Mounts to Curb the Size of Atlantic 
Yards, N.Y. SUN, Aug. 29, 2006, at 1. Renowned architect Frank Gehry is also 
planning the project. Cohen, Earlier, supra note 264. 
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potential environmental impact,275 and its use of eminent domain to 
secure land for construction:276 the Atlantic Yards Project under 
development in Prospect Heights, Brooklyn by Forest City Ratner 
Companies.277 
Surely, Lopez later downplayed charges of favoritism by 
claiming that the provision was not the real concern of critics. 
According to Lopez, Ratner “really wasn’t the issue, the real issue 
was income [levels to determine affordability] and [the expansion 
of] geographical areas, but the smokescreen was Ratner because it 
[was] a hot item.”278 Nevertheless, some former allies and 
supporters of the bill thought otherwise. The reaction to what was 
soon dubbed the “Ratner Carve Out” was swift and full of 
indignation.279 For instance, Assemblyman Hakeem Jeffries, a one-
time supporter of the Atlantic Yards project, declared that a “tax 
break available only to the developer, was ‘offensive’ because it 
promoted ‘economic segregation.’”280 Mayor Bloomberg asserted 
                                                           
274 See Atlantic Yards Report, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com (July 
25, 2007, 06:53 EST) (“The state gave $100 million. The city gave $200 
million. They waived the ULURP process. You don’t have to comply with the 
zoning requirements, so you can build ten, 15, 20 stories higher than anybody 
else, making additional money.”); Atlantic Yards Report, http:// 
atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com (Oct. 20, 2007, 06:37 EST). 
275 Atlantic Yards Report, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com (Sept. 
29, 2006, 06:50 EST). 
276 Atlantic Yards Report, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com (Nov. 10, 
2007, 06:42 EST). 
277 See Matthew Schuerman, 421a Bill Gives Special Treatment to Atlantic 
Yards, N.Y. OBSERVER, June 20, 2007, available at http://www.observer. 
com/2007/421a-bill-gives-special-treatment-atlantic-yards (“The one exception 
[to the new amendments] . . . can mean only one thing: Atlantic Yards.”). 
278 In fact, Lopez received over $6,000 in campaign contributions in his 
latest re-election bid for his Assembly seat from Michael Ratner and Karen 
Ranucci, brother and sister-in law of Forest City Ratner Companies’ CEO Bruce 
Ratner. Cohen, Earlier, supra note 264. However, in light of the complexity 
and breadth of the law’s legislative history and full circumstances of its passage, 
it is hard to conclude that such a small sum directed to one candidate was the 
entire, or even primary, impetus for inserting the provision. 
279 Id. 
280 Assemblyman Jeffries went on to state, “enough subsidy has already 
been given to this developer. There’s absolutely no reason to treat this project 
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that the carve-out would “hurt the very people that everybody 
talks about helping and gives some tax breaks to a developer that 
doesn’t need them and which we didn’t have to do.”281 
In the face of this mounting pressure, the extent of the Ratner 
carve-out was revised. While the income level for affordable units 
within the Atlantic Yards project remained at the higher threshold 
of 70% AMI, two conditions now applied as a stop-gap 
compromise, with the promise of further revisions in a subsequent 
amendment: the project’s tax-exempt period was reduced, and 
affordable units were mandated to be built concurrently with 
market-rate units.282 Thus, the 421-a amendments passed 
unanimously and the bill was signed into law.283 In his approval 
message, Governor Spitzer cautioned that while he “share[d] the 
Legislature’s desire to accelerate affordable housing production and 
slow . . . gentrification[, he] also share[d] New York City’s 
concerns about the impact of these three bills . . . on the level of 
subsidies for the Atlantic Yards project.” Spitzer continued, 
“Fortunately, the Legislature has agreed to further amend these 
                                                           
any more favorably than any other project that’s being built.” Atlantic Yards 
Report, supra note 274. 
281 Mayor Bloomberg added that he could “only hope that the Governor 
stands up and vetoes” the bill. Cohen, Bloomy, supra note 272. “Even Bertha 
Lewis of [the community reform organization] ACORN, a Ratner ally who is 
contractually barred from saying anything negative about the project, said that a 
state tax reform bill that exempted Ratner—and only Ratner—was ‘bad public 
policy.’” Editorial, The Ratner Clause, BROOKLYN PAPER, June 30, 2007, 
available at http://www.brooklynpaper.com/stories/30/26/30_26editorial.html. 
282 See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(13) (McKinney 2007), 
amended by A. 9293 § 6, 2007 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2007) (mandating that 
buildings with on-site affordable housing shall be eligible, provided that 20% of 
the units in any given building “are affordable to and occupied or available for 
occupancy by individuals or families the average of whose incomes at the time of 
initial occupancy do not exceed [70% AMI]”); Governor Spitzer, Approval 
Memorandum No. 40 Chapters 618, 619, 620, Memorandum filed with 
Assembly Bill Number 4408-A (2007), available at http://public.leginfo. 
state.ny.us/menugetf.cgi (type “A4408” in “Bill number” box, follow 
“Approval No. 40 of 2007” hyperlink). 
283 See Assembly Voting Record, A.9293, available at http://assembly. 
state.ny.us/leg/?bn=a9293 (last visited Apr. 14. 2008). 
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three bills with swift passage of . . . A.9373/S.6446.”284 
A.9373/S.6446 was ultimately passed in early 2008.285 In many 
ways, the amendment directly responded to the concerns of those 
who had opposed the Ratner Carve Out: affordability levels within 
Atlantic Yards are now mandated to be exactly the same as for 
other developers working with other sources of government 
funding, i.e., 20% of units affordable at an average of 90% AMI.286 
Further, affordable units are required to be available in the same 
buildings as market-rate apartments, precluding the possibility that 
those units would be segregated to certain buildings within the 
larger development.287 Additionally, certain amounts of affordable 
units now must be built during each phase of construction, which 
ensures that affordable units will be built as construction 
progresses rather than just towards the conclusion of the project.288 
A closer reading of the new amendment, however, still evinces 
special interests at work. Those buildings within Atlantic Yards 
that contain 20% affordable units are eligible for twenty-five years 
of tax benefits.289 Astoundingly, buildings within Atlantic Yards 
                                                           
284 Governor Spitzer, Approval Memorandum No. 40 Chapters 618, 619, 
620, Memorandum filed with Assembly Bill Number 4408-A (2007), available 
at http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/menugetf.cgi (type A4408 in “Bill number” 
box, follow “Approval No. 40 of 2007” hyperlink). 
285 S. 6446 § 7, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008). 
286 S. 6446 § 7. 
287 Compare N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(13) (McKinney 2007) 
(“[Benefits granted] if in the aggregate twenty percent of the units in such 
development are affordable to . . . families whose incomes . . . do not exceed 
[60% AMI].”), with S. 6446 § 7, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008) 
(“[Benefits granted if affordable housing requirements are met] in the aggregate 
for each successive fifteen hundred units of the project rather than for each 
multiple dwelling containing such fifteen hundred units and in the aggregate for 
the entire project rather than for each multiple dwelling in the project.”). 
288 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(13)(a)(iv) (McKinney 2007), 
amended by S. 6446 § 7, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008) (“[Benefits only 
go to] units in which, in the aggregate for each successive fifteen hundred units 
of the project rather than for each multiple dwelling containing such fifteen 
hundred units and in the aggregate for the entire project rather than for each 
multiple dwelling in the project.”) (emphasis added). 
289 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(13) (McKinney 2007), amended 
by S. 6446 § 7, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008) (“The period of tax 
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that do not meet this 20% affordability mandate are nevertheless 
eligible to receive tax benefits for fifteen years. As a result, while 
other developers are barred from receiving this fifteen-year tax 
benefit if they do not meet 421-a requirements, those portions of 
Atlantic Yards that do not comply with this provision are still 
entitled to receive tax such benefits.290 This extra period essentially 
translates into hundreds of millions of dollars for Ratner that other 
developers are simply not eligible for.291 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE 421-A PROGRAM AMENDMENTS 
“The original bill [I proposed was] my overall goal,” reflected 
Assemblyman Lopez, “[but] the reality was I could have stopped 
[affordable] housing totally by having the bill vetoed and then there 
would be nothing . . . . There is a role for the tax breaks, but not at 
the expense of affordable housing.”292 Even with legislative 
compromises, there is little doubt that the amendments expand the 
commitment to affordable housing when compared to prior 
versions of the law. The new 421-a program decidedly points 
toward a greater equalization of the existing disparities between the 
program’s twin goals of housing development and affordable 
housing construction293 and among its three policy objectives of 
decent shelter, wealth creation, and efficient use of public funds.294 
The exclusion zone has been expanded to encompass more 
neighborhoods, mandating on-site affordable units in more locations 
across the City and curbing runaway profits for market-rate 
                                                           
benefits awarded to such multiple dwelling shall be the same as the period of tax 
benefits awarded under clause (A) of subparagraph (iii) of paragraph (a) of 
subdivision two of this section,” but parts of the project that do not meet general 
requirements can still receive benefits that are “the same as the period of tax 
benefits awarded under clause (A) of subparagraph (ii) of paragraph (a) of 
subdivision two of this section.”). 
290 Atlantic Yards Report, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com (Aug. 11, 
2007, 06:25 EST). 
291 Id. 
292 Interview with Vito Lopez, supra note 234. 
293 CHPC, ENHANCE, supra note 43, at 5. 
294 See Byrne & Diamond, supra note 13, at 531. 
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developers.295 In a similar vein, the negotiable certificate program 
has been eliminated in lieu of requiring on-site affordable units.296 
Further, the eligibility levels with respect to AMI have been 
somewhat reduced, thus ensuring that the program is more directly 
tailored to help New Yorkers with lower income levels.297 This 
target population now has a greater opportunity to retain more of 
their earnings as affordable housing will allow them to pay closer to 
30% of their income toward housing, instead of the 40-50% or 
more that many did under the previous version of the program.298 
As an additional wealth creation facet of the new 421-a program, 
the prevailing wage provision will arguably help to ensure that 
these employees earn comparable wages.299 The amended program 
will thus be useful in enabling the City to realize Mayor 
Bloomberg’s plan to “create and preserve 165,000 units of 
                                                           
295 See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW §§ 421-a(11); 421-a (7)(f); 421-a (9)(c) 
(McKinney 2007). 
296 See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(7)(f) (McKinney 2007). 
297 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(7)(c)(ii) (McKinney 2007), 
amended by S. 6446 § 1, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008). 
298 Compare N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(7)(c) (McKinney 2007), 
amended by S. 6446 § 1, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008) (providing tax 
benefits either if 20% of units are rented to families earning 60% AMI, or, if the 
developer finances the project with government assistance, if 20% of units are 
rented to families earning an average of 90% AMI), with N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX 
LAW § 421-a(2)(a)(ii) (McKinney 2005) (providing tax benefits if 20% of units 
are rented to families earning 80% AMI). The extra savings for these families 
comes from the fact that the base rent for affordable units is now, under the non-
government assistance option, 30% of 60% AMI ($12,762), instead of 30% of 
80% AMI ($17,016). No doubt, though, this change comes with a cost, as 
eligibility to those earning over the 60% limit is eliminated, thus precluding 
those families earning more than $42,540 from obtaining affordable housing 
under this particular program. See id. Further, the option for developers to 
finance projects through government assistance arguably leaves families earning 
low-income wages in a worse off position than they were under the old version 
of the program. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(7)(c) (McKinney 2007), 
amended by S. 6446 § 1, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008).  Under this 
provision, developers are permitted to seek families earning on average $63,810 
(90% AMI). See supra notes 235–42 and accompanying text.  
299 See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(8) (McKinney 2007). 
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affordable housing” for 500,000 New Yorkers by 2013.”300 
Notwithstanding these improvements, the new legislation begs 
the same fundamental question as before in light of the dramatic 
changes in the City’s economic vitality over the past 35 years, the 
current landscape of the City’s real estate market, and the 
program’s lackluster track record relative to affordable housing:301 
whether the program’s trade-off of uncollected tax revenues for 
increased affordable housing construction is now an optimal one. 
Touting the legislation’s comparative improvements skirts the 
issue; such assertions are hardly conclusive that the amendments 
actually ensure effective use of public funds in the best manner 
possible or even to a meaningful extent. 
A. Decent Shelter 
1. No Quantifiable Performance Targets 
One way to examine 421-a’s impact is by focusing on the 
amount of affordable units created under the program for a given 
period of time. Such analysis in the past has taken three factors 
into account: 1) the number of affordable units built under the 
program; 2) the total number of units built under the program; and 
3) the total number of units built City-wide.302 This method is a 
straightforward way of showing how much “decent shelter” the 
program provides.303 
One reason that previous attempts to measure the effectiveness 
of the 421-a program have been so complicated is that there were 
no specific performance metrics to serve as benchmarks for 
whether or not the program was effective.304 Unfortunately, the 
                                                           
300 NYC DEP’T OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV., THE NEW HOUSING 
MARKETPLACE: CREATING HOUSING FOR THE NEXT GENERATION, supra note 
23, at 3. 
301 See supra notes 116–62 and accompanying text. 
302 IBO, FISCAL, supra note 44, at 4. 
303 Byrne & Diamond, supra note 13, at 532. 
304 Compare N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(10)(a) (McKinney 2007) 
(outlining monitoring procedures for the program, but no specific goals or 
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new legislation does not address this basic problem. When asked 
what successful results for the 421-a program would look like, 
Assemblyman Lopez replied, “You will find thousands of units 
that have 20% [on-site affordable housing units].”305 This 
response, coupled with legislative silence as to a quantitative 
goal,306 illustrates the lack of any specific, publicly defined 
benchmarks or methodologies for which to meaningfully weigh 
results. In a data-oriented era of accountability, a program that 
stands to cost the public so much money but lacks adequate tools 
to measure it is difficult to defend. 
Absent quantifiable performance targets, it is, and will continue 
to be, virtually impossible to determine whether the 421-a program 
is efficient. As long as some indeterminate amount of affordable 
housing is built, supporters of the program will publicize the 
program’s success, and opponents will claim that the program is a 
failure. Such post hoc rationalization prevents politicians, and the 
public, from accurately measuring the program’s success; it only 
fosters unfocused and ultimately unsupported debate on whether 
the number of affordable units built exceeded, met, or fell short of 
expectations. Unless and until there are clear performance goals, it 
will also continue to remain unclear whether the program is meeting 
expectations in terms of efficiently using public funds.307 
                                                           
benchmarks), with UNITED STATES OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS RESULTS-ORIENTED, A REPORT TO FEDERAL 
EMPLOYEES 1 (2004) [hereinafter A REPORT TO FEDERAL EMPLOYEES] (“[T]o be 
results-oriented, managers must ask themselves if the programs they administer 
are achieving the desired result at an acceptable cost. If the answer is “no” or 
“we don’t know,” they must do something about it, such as clearly define the 
desired outcomes . . . [and] develop aggressive timeframes for taking 
action . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
305 Interview with Vito Lopez, supra note 234. 
306 See generally, N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW §421-a (McKinney 2007); 
NEW YORK CITY, CODE § 11-245.1(d) (2007). No quantifiable goals exist in 
either the state or the local law. 
307 See A REPORT TO FEDERAL EMPLOYEES supra note 304, at 1. 
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2. A Weak Yet Rigid Market/Affordable Mix Mandate 
The modified 421-a program continues to promote a rigid 
policy that imposes a strict building-mix percentage of affordable-
housing to market-rate-apartments with no flexibility. Significantly, 
maintaining the 80% market/20% affordable mix makes it 
impossible to maximize the potential to create decent and 
affordable shelter as compared to other proposals advanced by 
affordable housing advocates and some members of the City 
Council.308 Approximately 92,000 units were built under 421-a 
between 1985 and 2006; roughly 4,900 of these were deemed 
affordable.309 Given the on-site provision now in place, if another 
92,000 units were hypothetically built under new program, 18,400 
(20%) affordable units would be produced.310  
By contrast, a more forceful program that mandated 30% 
affordable units within the exclusion zone would produce 27,600 
affordable units. Alternatively, even a flexible tax incentive program 
that provided developers with increased incentives for developing 
over the minimum standard of 20% would have likely yielded more 
than 18,400 units.311 Instead, the new program eschews both more 
stringent and more flexible standards, opting instead for the 
identical, unyielding 80% to 20% mix of market- and affordable-
rate units as before. In failing to reflect either of the alternative 
options, the legislation essentially precludes the possibility that 
developers might tailor their projects to include more affordable 
units.312 
                                                           
308 See supra notes 133–36, 139–40, 152–53, 155–56 and accompanying 
text. 
309 See 2007 HSR, supra note 53, at 16. 
310 See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(7)(f) (McKinney 2007) 
(mandating on-site units in order to receive 421-a tax benefits). 
311 See CHPC, ENHANCE, supra note 43, at 8–9. 
312 Id. For example, allowing developers the flexibility to increase the 
proportion of affordable units to 40% in exchange for increasing the maximum 
allowable household income of renters could result in higher levels of affordable 
housing while simultaneously allowing developers to maintain their profit 
margins. 
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3. An Unfunded Affordable Housing Fund? 
On its face, the addition of an Affordable Housing Fund sounds 
like a fair replacement for a negotiable certificate program that 
benefited market-rate developers far more than off-site affordable 
housing developers. According to Councilmember Yassky, though, 
the Fund is “nothing but smoke and mirrors” and is “utterly 
without substance.”313 “The City already spends fair amount on 
affordable housing,”314 Yassky pointed out, “and this [supposedly 
new] commitment only means that the City will spend at least 
this—[absolutely] not $400 million over and above what we 
already spend. Where is the additional $400 million?”315 Indeed, 
there is no additional funding; the Fund merely re-commits funds 
for affordable housing that were already earmarked for promoting 
affordable housing.316 
Moreover, not only has the money not yet been allocated 
according to the criteria outlined above,317 but also there is no 
statutory timeline in which the money in such a Fund would be 
spent or replenished.318 For instance, if money from the Fund is 
stretched out over many years, the amount of affordable units built 
from the Fund in a given year could be less than what could be built 
using negotiable certificates. Alternatively, if a large portion of the 
Fund is initially used on a limited group of affordable housing 
projects, there is nothing to assure that there will continue to be 
                                                           
313 Telephone Interview with David Yassky, New York City Council 
Member for the 33rd Council District, in Manhattan, N.Y. (Nov. 16, 2007). 
314 Id. Such HPD-administered programs that promote affordable housing 
include the Section 8 Program; Mitchell-Lama Housing; Low Income Housing 
Tax Credits; and the Low Income Affordable Marketplace Program. See 
Department of Housing Preservation and Development Home Page, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd (last visited Apr. 14, 2008). 
315 Telephone Interview with David Yassky, supra note 313. 
316 NEW YORK CITY, CHARTER § 1805(1-2) (2006). (“[T]he commissioner 
shall be authorized to establish or cause to be established an affordable housing 
trust fund . . . such fund may be established through agreement with a public 
benefit corporation authorized pursuant to the private housing finance law to 
finance the development and rehabilitation of affordable housing.”). 
317 Interview with Vito Lopez, supra note 234. 
318 See NEW YORK CITY LOCAL LAW No. 58 § 9 (2006). 
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money in the Fund in the future.319 
The consequence of an unfunded Affordable Housing Fund is 
that the Fund will likely provide for little more than what was built 
through the negotiable certificate program.320 This suggests that in 
addition to the Fund being under-funded, the money, if allocated, 
runs a high risk of being even less cost-efficient than the older 
version of the certificate program. According to Yassky, it may be 
better to either revise the negotiable certificate program so that 
developers are required to purchase a certain amount of off-site 
certificates if they chose to develop within the exclusion zone, or 
regulate the certificate system and enforce a substantially higher 
price.321 
B. Wealth Creation 
1. Setting Tax Incentives for Developers as the Default 
Despite the substantive policy alterations to the 421-a program 
since 1971,322 the underlying conceptual framework has not been 
significantly changed by any new legislation. The statute’s default 
position still holds that real estate developers have a right to tax 
exemptions when building in the City.323 This default position is 
                                                           
319 NEW YORK CITY LOCAL LAW No. 58 § 9. Absent from the law is any 
mechanism to replenish whatever money may be first established in the Fund, 
such as devoting property tax payments from developers who chose not to take 
advantage of 421-a to replenishing the Fund. NEW YORK CITY LOCAL LAW No. 
58 § 9. 
320 Telephone Interview with David Yassky, supra note 313. 
321 Id. Indeed, Yassky’s counter to the removal of the negotiable certificate 
program has merit only if the City devises a way to administer the negotiable 
certificate program, instead of allowing a private market to govern the sale and 
purchase of certificates. 
322 See supra notes 75–115 and accompanying text. 
323 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(7)(a)(ii) (McKinney 2007) 
(outlining the various “geographic exclusion areas” within the City). The 
continued existence of these exclusion areas—essentially sections of the City 
where developers must meet certain affordable housing obligations in order to 
receive tax benefits—shows that the default scenario for purposes of the 421-a 
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perhaps best evidenced by the so-called “exclusion zone”—only 
within its boundaries are developers excluded from receiving the as-
of-right tax benefits unless they meet certain criteria.324 Outside the 
zone, though, developers still receive benefits as-of-right.325 
This illustrates a built-in fear that if the default position is 
shifted, developers will simply not build because profits will not 
be high enough.326 However, the premise that tax incentives are 
necessary to entice developers to build in the City is flawed. Given 
the lack of housing in the City327 and the constant, rapid 
population growth,328 it appears equally likely, if not more so, that 
the market itself would generate development. As Assemblyman 
Lopez suggested, “because the growth in population is so high [and 
there is] limited land, [developers] will build no matter what.”329 
Indeed, the majority of buildings constructed between 1985 and 
2006 were built outside of the 421-a program.330 Given a more 
restrictive current program, it is unlikely that developers will now 
decide to build within the program.331 Even if there were City-wide 
requirements for the use of 421-a, it is still quite likely that the 
potential profits to developers would be large enough that they 
would continue to build even without the tax incentive and with 
some provisions of affordability. In fact, some large cities, 
including Los Angeles and Seattle, demonstrate a more aggressive 
approach to affordable housing through their development policies 
                                                           
program is still a situation where developers are granted tax benefits as-of-right. 
324 Interview with David Yassky, New York City Council Member for the 
33rd Council District, in Manhattan, N.Y. (Oct. 5, 2007). 
325 See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(7)(a)(ii) (McKinney 2007). 
Since this section delineates areas where developers cannot receive tax benefits 
without providing affordable housing, the parts of the City not covered by this 
section are therefore still fair game for developers to receive benefits as-of-right, 
without meeting any affordable housing criteria, should they choose to develop 
there. 
326 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
327 See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
328 See supra note 8. 
329 Interview with Vito Lopez, supra note 234. 
330 See 2007 HSR, supra note 53, at 16. 
331 See supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text. 
  
816 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
without hurting their housing markets.332 
For example, in Los Angeles, California, there is no as-of-right 
tax exemption for new development, and it only applies “for 100% 
affordable housing development owned by not-for-profits.”333 
Similarly, Seattle, Washington, statutorily compels developers to 
build between 20% and 30% affordable units across the city.334 
Neither of these cities has seen decreased development because of 
such aggressive approaches.335 Subsequently, if developers in these 
cities do not need additional inducements to build housing, it is 
hard to justify 421-a on the basis of either general development or 
affordable housing. 
2. The Exclusion Zone’s “Halo” Effect 
Along with leaving the 421-a program in the pro-developer 
default position, an additional concern implicit in the new 
amendments is the effect on neighborhoods that fall on the edge of 
the exclusion zone. Failing to enact a City-wide exclusion zone has 
another consequence with respect to wealth creation, albeit an 
unintended one. As a result of the exclusion boundaries, a “halo” on 
the outer edge of some areas336 adjacent to the exclusion zone has 
formed, where developers, in addition to current landlords, are not 
bound by 421-a’s mandates and so could ostensibly fetch 
increasingly higher market-rate rents due to gentrification.337 In 
                                                           
332 PRATT, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 34, at 6. 
333 Id. As such, developers who develop market-rate units are simply not 
eligible for tax exemptions; the exemption is only available for not-for-profit 
developers who pledge that all of the units in a project will be affordable. Id. 
334 Id. 
335 Id. 
336 See supra note 204 and accompanying text. Some of these areas 
experiencing this “halo” effect include sections of Williamsburg and Greenpoint 
in Brooklyn and Long Island City in Queens. 
337 See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a(7)(a)(ii) (McKinney 2007); See 
also Laura Wolf-Powers, Pratt Center for Community Development, Why Job-
killing Rezonings Don’t Make Sense: A Response to the Manhattan Institute, 
June 2005, http://www.prattcenter.net/pol-response.php (“[In the context of the 
Greenpoint-Williamsburg rezoning process,] the spillover effects of new market-
rate development in any particular such neighborhood are difficult to estimate, 
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turn, long-time community residents in these areas face the 
prospect of being forced out of their neighborhoods even though 
the purpose of 421-a is to help families earning low-and moderate-
incomes.338 To be sure, it is one thing to provide affordable 
housing, but quite another to mandate that developers should be 
precluded from increased housing for more new people in the City. 
That said, incentivizing such development by allowing developers 
to take advantage of tax benefits and high rents in these areas 
stands in direct contradiction to the goals of the 421-a program.339 
As Assemblyman Lopez explained, the Legislature “picked 
areas that were being gentrified [to be included in the zone], parts 
of Williamsburg [for example]. Right now, as-of-right, they get a 
tax break right next door” in an area adjacent to the exclusion zone 
due to the lack of affordability provisions for areas nearby the 
exclusion zone.340 “They rent [apartments for] $3000, $4000, 
$5000 a month all throughout Williamsburg. Over 25 years, 
[developers] are getting up to $100 million [in tax incentives], and I 
think that is outrageous. It is really maximizing profits versus 
coming back with a decent return.”341 
While the exclusion zones mandate affordability standards, the 
edges of the zones do just the opposite. Developments within the 
Williamsburg-Greenpoint exclusion zone, for instance, force drastic 
change on the out-of-zone waterfront, encouraging robust 
development which is not restricted by 421-a, and further stands to 
adversely affect the upland areas of Williamsburg and Greenpoint 
as well, which are quickly becoming more and more populated with 
new and wealthier residents.342 Martin Needelman, the Project 
Director of Brooklyn Legal Services Corporation A, observed, “As 
more market-rate housing becomes available on the waterfront, 
current upland landlords are looking to maximize their profits,” 
                                                           
but . . . the city’s Environmental Impact Statement projected that 2,510 people 
could be subject to secondary displacement, a figure that activists on the ground 
critiqued as far too low.”). 
338 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
339 Id. 
340 Interview with Vito Lopez, supra note 234. 
341 Id. 
342 See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text. 
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even if it means pressuring existing long-term low-income tenants 
to move out of their apartments at the conclusion of their leases, or 
using similar schemes to force them out before their lease is up.343 
“This is a situation where supply is actually driving demand. 
Waves of émigrés from Manhattan” are willing and able to pay 
more than what residents of low- or moderate-income housing can 
afford, and developers and landlords are similarly willing and able 
to increase their profit margin by driving up rents on non-421-a 
buildings within the exclusion zone, as well as on buildings just 
outside of the zone.344 “These tactics,” said Needelman, “combined 
with the rise of new market rate housing in the area, threaten the 
availability of real affordable housing” and the viability of the 
diverse community that has lived there for years.345 
3. Ill-Fitted AMI Calculation As Reflected By Atlantic Yards 
As with the preservation of as-of-right tax benefits for 
developers and the economic externalities created by the exclusion 
zone, the special provisions for Atlantic Yards evince an intent of 
the 421-a program that is not squarely in line with the rhetoric of 
affordable housing. Special giveaways to individual developers only 
undercut the program’s benefits to working-class families because 
they reveal the program itself to be a tool designed to 
disproportionately advantage developers, however superficially 
modified. 
While the amended Ratner Clause alone is problematic, it is also 
equally symptomatic of a larger problem—the use of HUD’s 
regional AMI calculation, which includes many wealthier sections 
of the metropolitan area and thus artificially boosts AMI for the 
entire City.346 It may be difficult to decouple the City’s program 
from HUD’s regional AMI calculation,347 but the federal 
                                                           
343 Telephone Interview with Martin Needleman, Project Director, 
Brooklyn Legal Services Corporation A, in Brooklyn, N.Y. (July 3, 2007). 
344 Id. 
345 Id. 
346 See supra notes 60–74 and accompanying text. 
347 Public Hearing, supra note 49, at 55 (statement of Shaun Donnovan, 
HPD Commissioner). 
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government does not require the 421-a program to follow any 
national guidelines because it is not financed by federal money.348 
Narrowing the scope of the AMI to a City-wide level ($43,434)349 
or even a neighborhood-by-neighborhood level seems entirely 
plausible.350 Without any change in the scope of the AMI 
calculation, though, the program remains poorly tailored to the 
actual City-wide AMI, not to mention AMI at a borough or 
neighborhood level.351 
Brooklyn residents are in fact some of the least-benefited by 
HUD’s regional AMI calculation, as illustrated by the Atlantic 
Yards project. Because Brooklyn’s AMI is currently at $37,000,352 
“only 40[%] (900) of the affordable units would be geared to 
average Brooklynites.”353 For those living in the shadow of the 
development, those numbers drop to a mere 24%—approximately 
562 of the affordable units and 12% of the total rental units.354 The 
reality is that Atlantic Yards is already being given many subsidies 
above and beyond 421-a.355 It is questionable why Atlantic Yards 
                                                           
348 421-a is a combination of state and local legislation, and no city or state 
funds are used because of the very nature of the program—the provision of tax 
benefits to developers, in the form of tax exemptions, who choose to work 
within the program’s criteria. See generally N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-
a (McKinney 2007). 
349 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
350 One reason why it might be difficult to decouple the 421-a program from 
the HUD-defined AMI calculation is that portions of the program itself still 
contemplate substantial government financing. See supra notes 235–42 and 
accompanying text. As a result of this provision, developers receiving 
substantial federal funds for their development would have to meet both the 
HUD-defined AMI income level for the given federal program the developer was 
receiving subsidies from, as well as the 421-a program’s standards. Id.; see also 
supra notes 60–74 and accompanying text. As an additional concern, it might 
also be difficult to determine the appropriate scope for the income-level 
calculation, i.e., whether to set affordability levels based on a City, borough, or 
neighborhood AMI. 
351 See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
352 Miller, supra note 222. 
353 Atlantic Yards Report, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com (July 25, 
2006, 06:46 EST). 
354 Id. 
355 Atlantic Yards Report, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com (June 6, 
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should also get such additional, disproportionate and beneficial 
treatment under 421-a for so little in return.356 
CONCLUSION 
“The way the City is situated now, you don’t need the 421-a 
program . . . . It is not like it was [in the 1970’s when the City 
was] losing people. [Then, there were] tens of thousands of vacant 
lots and abandoned buildings. Now, the situation has changed—the 
                                                           
2007, 06:34 EST) (“[M]ore than half [of the financing for Atlantic Yards will] 
come either directly from the government or from government-assisted resources: 
$637.2 million in tax-free bonds to finance the arena; [$205] million from New 
York City; $100 million from New York State; and $1.4 billion in tax-free 
bonds to finance the affordable housing.”). 
356 By digging deeper into the financing of Atlantic Yards, it becomes more 
apparent that the project will not enhance affordable housing as much as its 
promoters claim. Atlantic Yards will eventually receive subsidies not only from 
the 421-a program, but from a 50-30-20 mixed-income program as well. This 
50-30-20 program is provided through the N.Y.C. Housing Development 
Corporation, an “issuer of bonds for multi-family affordable housing.” N.Y.C. 
Housing Development Corporation, What is HDC?, http://www.nychdc. 
com/about/about.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2008); Atlantic Yards Report, 
supra note 353. Of the project’s 4,500 rentals, 50% (2250) will be market-rate, 
30% (1350) aimed at those earning middle-income, and 20% (900) aimed at 
those earning low-income. Five “housing income bands” comprise the 2,250 
units considered affordable. 225 units at Band 1 (from 30% to 40% AMI), 675 
units at Band 2 (41% to 50% AMI); 450 units at Band 3 (60% to 100% AMI); 
and 450 each at Band 4 (101% to 140% AMI) and Band 5 (from 141% to 160% 
AMI). It is curious that the 50% to 59% AMI range is completely absent from 
the income bands. Atlantic Yards Report, supra note 353. Atlantic Yards will 
also include some 2,360 condominiums. Id. Given that the income bands range 
from 30-40% AMI to 141-160% AMI, it is critical that relative to the City’s 
current AMI of $70,900, only 1350 of these units (or 30% of the affordable units) 
will fall below this level; only 900 units (20%) will fall below the 60% AMI 
level required for all other projects receiving 421-a benefits. Approximately 
1,112 (less than 25% of total units) will qualify under Atlantic Yards’ inflated 
70% requirement. Id. Since the income bands set a minimum and maximum 
income level, it is not difficult to imagine that the developer will choose to rent 
apartments to those families earning at the higher ends of these bands, thereby 
depressing even further the actual number of truly affordable apartments to be 
built. 
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dynamic changed.”357 As the bill’s prime sponsor in the 
Legislature, Lopez’s comment is particularly revealing and 
somewhat paradoxical. The market is unlikely to voluntarily 
provide affordable housing,358 and it may very well be that the new 
legislation is better than none at all. Nevertheless, the amendments 
are too little, too late. Tax abatements for constructing market-rate 
housing are no longer necessary in today’s City; developers will 
likely continue to build without extra incentives. As a result, 421-a 
will remain a relic of the past unless significant revisions are made. 
The program continues to misallocate public funds by giving away 
too much in tax incentives for not enough public benefit in return. 
Further, it only has an indirect expectation that affordable housing 
will trickle-down to those who need it instead of directly 
addressing the problem. 
Rhetoric and political compromise aside, the fact that 
affordable housing does not play a more robust role in 421-a is 
problematic. Indirect promotion of affordable housing through tax 
incentives to developers, as provided in the new 421-a provisions, 
necessarily demonstrates that the program’s goals lie elsewhere: in 
perpetuating a giveaway of public funds that would otherwise have 
been collected from developers. Despite the improvements in the 
revised 421-a program, it falls short in advancing affordable 
development because developers’ profits are only marginally 
curtailed at the expense of significant unrealized public benefits.359 
In contrast to the three overarching policy goals the law 
purportedly advances—decent shelter, wealth creation, and 
efficient use of public funds—the results reflects an anemic and 
unjustifiable program that continues to put developers ahead of 
families earning low- and moderate-incomes. As a result, public 
funds continue to be used inefficiently because “decent shelter” 
provisions are not as sufficiently robust as they could have been, 
and “wealth creation” for families earning low-income continues to 
be trumped by deference to developers’ profits.360 
                                                           
357 Interview with Vito Lopez, supra note 234. 
358 Byrne & Diamond, supra note 13, at 530–31. 
359 See Bradley Hope, Tax Abatement Debate To Be Revived, THE N.Y. 
SUN, Feb. 28, 2008, at 10. 
360 See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text. 
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The City Council will have the first opportunity to reexamine 
elements of the 421-a program in December of 2008.361 
Assemblyman Lopez, the bill’s prime sponsor, has indicated that 
he “would love to reevaluate in three years, to bring down the 
income [requirement for eligibility for affordable housing] and make 
it broader [more inclusive] than it is now. [His ultimate] objective 
is a City-wide 70/30 program, and to make the 30% affordability 
income level much lower.”362 The courage must be found to revise 
the 421-a program so that it truly delivers on its overarching 
premise and on what Jacob Riis maintained more than a century 
ago was one of the principal responsibilities of government in this 
critical area:363 well-defined, progressive legislation to ensure the 
continued existence of affordable housing for the City’s families 
earning low- and moderate-incomes. 
 
                                                           
361 See NEW YORK CITY, CODE § 11-245.1(d) (2007) (establishing a 
boundary review commission to determine exclusion zone boundaries in even-
numbered years). Other sections of the 421-a program will expire in 2010. See 
also NEW YORK CITY LOCAL LAW No. 58 § 12 (2006). 
362 Interview with Vito Lopez, supra note 234. This would ostensibly be 
accomplished by: 1) modifying the mandatory market-affordable mix within the 
exclusion zone to reflect 70% market-rate units and 30% affordable units; and 2) 
maintaining the HUD-defined AMI as the benchmark for the program, but 
lowering the AMI from the current 60% limit. Id. 
363 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
